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Executive Summary 
The specific bilateral deficit we examine in this report-the bilateral automotive trade 
deficit with Japan-still accounts for a larger share of the overall U.S. trade deficit than any 
other bilateral, product-specific category of trade. In 1990, the U.S.-Japan automotive trade 
deficit was $31.1 billion, or 28% of the U.S. total trade deficit and 76% of the overall 1990 
U.S. trade deficit with Japan. Our analysis indicates that the size of this deficit will not be 
reduced in coming years, but will change importantly in composition. An understanding of the 
development of this specific trade deficit is critical in the formation of policies meant to improve 
overall U.S. trade performance. 
Our estimate of the level of the U.S.-Japan bilateral automotive trade deficit is a 
combination of separate forecasts of the vehicles and parts deficits. However, developments in 
U.S.-Japan vehicle trade largely determine patterns in the parts trade imbalance. The 1990 
vehicle deficit--or the trade imbalance between the United States and Japan in assembled cars, 
trucks and vans-is virtually the same, measured in constant dollars, in 1990 as it had been in 
1985. However, the constant dollar automotive parts deficit grew during 1985-1990 at an 
annual average rate of almost 17%. In 1990, the U.S.-Japan automotive parts deficit, a total of 
$10.5 billion, accounted for 99% of the total U.S. trade deficit in automotive parts. In other 
words, except for Japan, 1990 U.S. trade in automotive parts with the rest of world was 
virtually in balance. 
We use a "scenario-modelling method," to forecast the 1994 bilateral vehicles trade 
deficit with Japan. We first develop scenarios of the 1994 U.S. market, our best judgements 
of developments in the U.S. automotive market by 1994. That, in turn, requires forecasting 
the sales goals and achievements of the vehicle manufacturers, both Japanese and Big Three. 
We then link these projected sales patterns to the manufacturer's domestic-and foreign-vehicle 
sourcing patterns, We tie these automotive scenarios to the vehicle categories underlying the 
official statistics on the U.S. vehicle deficit. 
Our "Most Likely" vehicle trade scenario estimates 1994 Japanese vehicle imports of 
2.3 million, and U.S.-sourced vehicle exports to Japan of 89,000. In constant dollars, the 
vehicle import bill increases .05%, to $21.3 billion, while the current dollar increase is just 
over 20%, reaching $25.6 billion. Vehicle exports pass $1.5 billion constant dollars, up over 
260%, and $1.8 billion current dollars, an increase of over 300%. Subtracting vehicle exports 
from imports leaves a U.S. deficit of just under $19.8 billion constant dollars, down some 4% 
from 1990, or about $23.7 billion current dollars, some 15% higher than in 1990. 
We use a statistical forecast method to estimate the 1994 bilateral automotive parts trade 
deficit with Japan. The model is based on an analysis of the effects of Japanese transplant 
production, aftermarket demand, and demand from traditional U.S. vehicle producers for 
imported Japanese auto parts during 1985-1990. For example, about $3,200 of imported of 
auto parts from Japan are related to unit assembly of Japanese vehicles in the United States 
during 1985-1990. Our 1994 forecast of parts imports from Japan is partially based, then, on 
a 1994 forecast of Japanese transplant vehicle production of 2.5 million. 
Our "Most Likely" parts trade scenario estimates that Japanese parts imports into the 
United States will reach $21.5 billion constant dollars in 1994, up over 89%, while the current 
dollar increase is just over 126%, reaching $25.7 billion. We simply trend U.S. parts exports 
to Japan on the basis of annual average growth demonstrated by such shipments in 1985- 1990. 
Thus, we forecast constant dollar parts exports to Japan of $3.1 billion in 1994, a 247% 
increase, while the current dollar increase is 320%, reaching $3.8 billion. Subtracting parts 
exports from imports leaves a U.S. deficit of $18.3 billion constant dollars, up almost 75% 
from 1990, or about $22.0 billion current dollars, some 110% higher than in 1990. 
We also perform a detailed analysis of the sourcing practices of a "leading" Japanese 
transplant assembler in 1989. The selected case study is found to be the leading Japanese 
transplant producer in terms of U.S. domestic sourcing of parts and component purchases. 
The purpose of the exercise is to check our statistical results on likely patterns in transplant 
sourcing in recent years, and the future behavior of other, lower volume and more recent 
transplant producers in future years. Our analysis is based on both public and internal, OSAT 
sources of information. Our results indicate that, in 1989, approximately 38% of customs the 
value of the transplant's U.S. vehicle production was sourced from Japan, 46% from 
transplant facilities in the United States, including the transplant's own, and 16% from U.S. 
traditional automotive suppliers and third country imports. We estimate that this producer 
achieved an average customs value based domestic content level of 62% in 1989. 
Our vehicle and parts trade forecasts are combined to yield overall estimates of the 
U.S.-Japan bilateral automotive deficit for 1994. Our "Most Likely" case projects a constant 
dollar 1994 deficit of $38.1 billion, up 23% from 1990, or about $45.7 billion current dollars, 
47% higher than in 1990. On the other hand, our "Best Case" scenario projects a total bilateral 
automotive trade deficit, including both vehicles and parts, of $29.4 billion (constant dollars), 
down some 5% from 1990. 
A major result of this study is our estimate of the growing importance of the parts 
deficit in the overall bilateral deficit. For example, our "Most Likely" constant and current 
dollar forecasts call for the share of the parts deficit to rise from 34% in 1990, to 48% in 1994. 
This would imply that almost half of the bilateral deficit will be directly determined by Japanese 
automotive firms operating in the United States or Japan through their specific decisions on 
sourcing. Our analysis and projections, then, suggest a continuing serious problem in the 
bilateral automotive trade deficit with Japan. 
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I. Introduction 
The United States still finds itself, at the beginning of the 1990s, facing a number of 
serious economic problems. The "twin deficits"-the federal budget deficit and the balance of 
trade deficit-are still among the most serious and consistent of these areas of concern. This 
report focuses on a conceptually narrow component of the U.S. trade deficit: the U.S. deficit 
in one product area with one country. Although limited in scope, the specific bilateral deficit 
we examine-the bilateral automotive trade deficit with Japan-still accounts for a larger share 
of the overall U.S. trade deficit than any other bilateral, product-specific category of trade. Our 
analysis indicates that the size of this deficit will not be reduced in the coming years, but will 
change importantly in composition. An understanding of the development of this specific trade 
deficit is critical in the formation of policies meant to improve overall U.S. trade performance. 
This report updates and extends our earlier 1989 study and forecast of the 1993 U.S.- 
Japan automotive trade deficit.1 We think this update is necessary. Our prior study 
highlighted the vehicle component of the trade deficit and lacked adequate information on the 
most dynamic portion of the overall U.S.-Japan automotive trade imbalance: the deficit in 
automotive parts and components. In this study we attempt to improve our prior analysis of 
the automotive parts imbalance through the use of new information and more advanced 
methods. Once again, the ultimate focus of our analysis is to project the likely bilateral 
automotive balance with Japan for a specific forecast year: 1994. Once again, we recognize 
that much of the forecast will be based on factors, developments, and events that are important 
in automotive competition, but may be less important in other trade areas. 
The U.S. Automotive Trade Balance 
Figure 1 displays the U.S. automotive trade deficit from 1985 through preliminary 
estimates for 1990.2 Automotive products generated a current-dollar deficit of $53 billion in 
1990, up from about $41 billion in 1985, but slightly down from about $57 billion in 1989. 
Complete vehicles accounted for a deficit of about $43 billion, up from a level of $41 billion in 
1989, reflecting vehicle imports of $53 billion and exports of $11 billion. Automotive parts, 
lMichael S. Flynn, Sean P. McAlinden, and David J. Andrea, The U.S.-Ja~an Bilateral 1993 
Automotive Trade Deficit, Office for the Study of Automotive Transportation, Transportation 
Research Institute, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1989. 
*AII automotive trade figures, unless otherwise noted, were supplied directly by the U.S. 
International Trade Commission, Washington D.C. Please see Appendix I for historical, trade- 
related data tables. 
The U.S.-Japan Bilateral 1994 Automotive Trade Deficit 
on the other hand, generated a deficit of almost $1 1 billion in 1990, a considerable reduction 
from $16 billion in 1989. 
Vehicle Trade Deficit 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission 
The importance of the automotive sector in overall U.S. trade performance is clear. 
The automotive trade deficit accounted for 49% of the preliminary estimate of 
the total U.S. merchandise deficit of $109 billion in 1990. In 1989, the 
automotive trade deficit accounted for 61% of the U.S. manufactured goods 
deficit, 52% of the merchandise trade deficit, and 51% of the total U.S. 
current account d e f i ~ i t . ~  As before, we are reluctant to attach specific causal meaning to 
the relationship of the automotive deficit to these broader deficits, which are composed of 
3 Preliminary estimate of 1990 U.S. merchandise trade deficit reported in Survev of Current 
Business, ILS, De~artment of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, March 1991, p. 43. 
Other 1989 non-automotive, customs value trade deficits are taken from various publications of 
International Trade Administration. The 1989 current account deficit reported in Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal System, Washington D.C., Volume 77, 
Number 3, March 1991, p. 53. 
thousands of bilateral, specific surpluses and deficits. We do contend however, that the 
automotive deficit represents a serious impediment to the further reduction of these broader 
deficits. In effect, the automotive deficit remains a significant, ongoing barrier to further 
serious improvement in overall U.S. trade performance. The scale of effort required to offset 
the automotive trade deficit through exports in other product areas would be enormous, and 
would require, we feel, a deliberate policy of picking "winners and losers" in U.S. trade and 
manufacturing in a world hardly yet characterized by free trade. 
Two patterns are present in the U.S. automotive trade deficit from 1985-1990. First, 
there is a growing importance of the automotive parts deficit in the overall automotive trade 
imbalance. In 1985, the automotive parts category accounted for less than 7% of the overall 
automotive deficit. The parts share rose to 27% of the total auto deficit by 1989, and then 
dropped to 20% in 1990. In fact, 73% of the increase in the automotive deficit between 1985 
and 1990 is due to change in the parts deficit. A second clear development is the consistent 
share of the Japanese bilateral deficit in the overall automotive trade deficit. Japanese 
automotive trade with the United States accounted for 57% of the automotive deficit in 1985, 
fell to 55% in 1987, but peaked again at 59% in 1989, and remained over 58% in 1990. No 
other U.S. bilateral automotive deficit has demonstrated such a consistent pattern in its shares 
of the broader deficit measures. 
The U.S.-Japan Automotive Trade Deficit 
Figure 2 displays the U.S.-Japan automotive trade deficit from 1985 through 
preliminary estimates for 1990. U.S. automotive trade with Japan generated a current dollar 
deficit of $31.1 billion in 1990, up 29% from $24.1 billion in 1985, but down slightly from 
$33.3 billion in 1989. In constant dollars, this deficit peaked at $34.8 billion in 1987, and the 
1990 level is 11% below this historic peak, representing an 18% increase from the 1985 level.4 
This constant dollar increase in the deficit developed in a period that saw the yenJdollar 
exchange rate fall from a level of 238 in 1985 to 138 in 1990, a macro-economic adjustment, 
many believe, which should have resulted in major decreases in this deficit. 
4Constant dollars of automotive shipments in this report are computed by using the Producer 
Price Index (PPI) for Motor Vehicle Equipment and Parts products, generated by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor and reported in various issues of the Survey of 
Current Business. The base period is September, 1990. Prior annual shipments are inflated 
using annual levels of the PPI for that year in ratio to the September, 1990 level. Prior 
monthly shipments are inflated using monthly levels of the PPI for that month in ratio to the 
September, 1990 level. 
The US. -Japan Bilateral 1994 Automotive Trade Deficit 
A striking development in the automotive trade imbalance with Japan is the growing 
contribution of the parts deficit to that overall bilateral deficit. In 1985, the parts deficit of $4.4 
billion accounted for about 18% of the total U.S.-Japan automotive deficit. The parts share 
rose to almost 23% in 1987, and continued to rise to almost 37% in 1990 when it reached 
$10.5 billion. It is important to note that, in constant dollars, the level of the vehicles deficit- 
or the trade imbalance between the United States and Japan in assembled cars, trucks, and 
vans-was virtually the same in 1990 as it had been in 1985. Even in constant dollars, 
however, the parts deficit grew throughout 1985-1 990, at an annual compound rate of 16.6%. 
The entire percentage increase in the overall U.S.-Japan automotive deficit, then, can be 
attributed to the increase in the parts imbalance. In 1990, the U.S.-Japan automotive 
parts deficit accounted for 99% of the total U.S. trade deficit in auto parts. In 
other words, except for Japan, 1990 U.S. trade in auto parts with the rest of 
the world was essentially in balance. 
U.S.-Japan Vehicle Deficit (current $) 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission 
4 
Figures 3 and 4 provide further detail on patterns in US.-Japan automotive trade. 
Dollar levels of vehicle imports into the United States from Japan peaked in both current and 
real dollars in 1986, a record U.S. sales year for motor vehicles. The constant dollar level of 
Japanese vehicle imports in 1990, however, was essentially at the same level as 1985. Dollar 
levels of parts imports to the United States, on the other hand, only recently peaked in 1989 at 
$11.6 billion, and only fell somewhat in 1990 to $11.4 billion. The recent 1989-1990 decline 
in parts imports was the only year-to-year decline in 1985-1990, a period during which 
Japanese parts imports grew at an annual compound growth rate of 19.6% measured in current 
dollars, or 17.4% using constant dollar amounts. 
Growth rates in U.S. exports of automotive products to Japan are even more 
impressive than those for parts imports from Japan. Unfortunately this impressive growth is 
based upon exceedingly small initial amounts. The United States exported only $20 million in 
vehicles to Japan in 1985, a total which grew at an annual rate of over 97% during 1985-1990 
to reach $587 million in 1990. In a similar fashion, U.S. 1985 parts exports to Japan of $203 
million grew at an annual rate of 34% through 1990, to reach $893 million in 1990. Clearly, 
these trends are positive developments. However, it is also clear that they must be maintained 
for some period of time to reduce substantially the overall level of the U.S.-Japan automotive 
trade imbalance. 
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Figure 3 
Value of Japanese Vehicle Imports into the United States 
1985- 1990 
-4- Japanese Vehicle Imports (current $) 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission 
Figure 4 
Value of Japanese Parts Imports into the United States 
1985-1990 
+ Japanese Parts Imports into U.S. (constant $) 
--+ Japanese Parts Imports into U.S. (current $) 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission 
The U.S.-Japan automotive trade deficit has historically accounted not only for a large 
share of the total U.S. automotive trade deficit, but also for an important share of the overall 
U.S.-Japan merchandise trade deficit. Preliminary estimates indicate that this larger, overall 
deficit may have fallen by 16% in 1989-1990, to a level of $41.1 billion. If so, the 1990 
automotive imbalance with Japan was responsible for 76% of the overall U.S. merchandise 
trade deficit with Japan, up from 70% in 1989. U.S.-Japan automotive trade also affects a 
number of other broader bilateral deficits with Japan. This has become especially important 
with the construction and operation of over 250 Japanese affiliated automotive assembly and 
parts facilities in the United States, and with the further expansion of Japanese automotive 
production in a number of countries that trade with the United States. 
Any comprehensive discussion on the full effect of the Japanese automotive sector on 
U.S. trade performance must reflect the following developments: 
Japanese automotive firms have invested at least $13 billion in production 
facilities located in the United States by 1989. The purpose of these facilities 
is to produce vehicles and automotive parts, primarily for sale in the United 
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States. Yet there is considerable evidence that the bulk of the investment in 
construction of these facilities was sourced to Japanese construction firms 
operating in the United States, and that an overwhelming share of the machine 
tools and other equipment placed in these facilities were imported from 
producers based in Japan. Finally, many of the financial services associated 
with these investments were provided by Japanese financial firms. The first 
and third of these activities increase the U.S. current account and services 
deficits with Japan, although they are not reflected in the official "automotive 
trade deficit." The second, Japanese imports of machine tools and equipment 
for use in their transplant facilities, increases the U.S. merchandise deficit 
with Japan in products outside of the automotive sector. 
Profits earned on these transplant investments will eventually return to Japan 
and exacerbate the U.S. current account deficit for years to come.5 
I m ~ o r t s  of parts and components-connected to sales of Japanese vehicles in 
the United States-from Japanese-affiliated suppliers in third nations such as 
Taiwan, South Korea, Canada, Mexico, and Malaysia, worsen the overall 
automotive and merchandise trade position of the United States, although they 
do not appear in the bilateral trade figures with Japan. 
Ja~anese  automotive com~etition in traditional overseas U.S. export markets 
for automotive ~roducts .  such as Canada, Latin America. and the Middle 
East, reduces U.S. exports to those regions.' Finally, ~ a ~ a n e s e  competition in 
Western Europe can be expected to reduce the profit performance of U.S. 
subsidiaries operating in those regions, and thus the u.S: current account. 
The trade effects of these developments are not reflected in the official bilateral 
automotive trade statistics, which increasingly, therefore, underestimate the full impact of 
Japanese automotive activity on the U.S. trade balance. However, these additional trade 
effects are not a direct subject of this study. Furthermore, we do not discuss the social and 
economic costs--other than their direct effects on bilateral automotive trade-of Japanese 
automotive competition in the United States. These costs-which include, for example, the 
rapid socioeconomic decline of a number of U.S. central cities, and the loss of many billions in 
tax revenue through reduced U.S. economic growth-surely exist, and are tremendous in 
scope. The goal of this study, however, is to understand and forecast the more narrowly 
defined US.-Japanese bilateral automotive trade in vehicles and parts through 1994. 
5 ~ o r  a precise discussion of the effect of transplants on this area of the national income and 
product accounts see: Lany R. Moran, "Motor Vehicles, Model Year 1990," Survey of Current 
Business, Volume 70, Number 11, November 1990, p. 29. 
11. Data and Method 
We use a "scenario-modelling method," a combination of accounting and regression 
models, to forecast the 1994 bilateral automotive trade deficit with Japan. We first develop 
scenarios of the 1994 U.S. market, our best judgments of developments in the U.S. 
automotive market by 1994. That, in turn, requires forecasting the sales goals and 
achievements of the vehicle manufacturers, both Japanese and Big Three. We then link these 
projected sales patterns to the manufacturers' domestic- and foreign-vehicle sourcing patterns. 
We tie these automotive scenarios to the vehicle categories underlying the official statistics on 
the U.S. vehicle deficit. 
The linkage of these automotive scenarios to the deficit is based on the analysis of U.S. 
sales, build, fleet, and import data over the 69 months from January, 1985 through September, 
1990. This analysis yields coefficients that link vehicle sales volumes and sourcing patterns to 
the customs value of vehicle imports, and vehicle build and fleet composition to the customs 
value of part imports. These coefficients, characteristic of the 1985-1990 period, are then 
applied to the 1994 automotive scenarios. This yields the predicted customs values, in constant 
dollars, of vehicle and part imports from Japan in 1994. The current dollar estimate is formed 
by correcting these constant dollars to reflect increases in the consumer price index (CPI), 
vehicle prices, and the exchange rate. 
Forecasting the 1994 automotive trade deficit with Japan also requires developing a 
scenario of 1994 U.S. vehicle and parts exports to Japan. We again tie the customs values of 
U.S. vehicle exports to Japan to our automotive scenarios. We project part exports to Japan by 
simply extrapolating the trend of the 1985 to 1990 p e r i ~ d . ~  This permits taking both bilateral 
imports and exports into account. 
We rely on two automotive scenarios, both grounded in the description of the U.S. 
market in 1990. These scenarios focus on the performance of Japanese produced vehicles in 
the 1994 U.S. market, including the likely sourcing of those vehicles from Japanese and U.S. 
production facilities. These 1994 market projections reflect our assumptions and analyses of 
6 ~ e  simply do not have enough knowledge of the plans of the Japanese manufacturers to 
develop specific U.S. sourcing scenarios. Our projection is, in our view, almost assuredly 
optimistic, calling for more than tripling the value of U.S. part exports to Japan by 1994. 
However, that makes it conservative in estimating the trade deficit, because overestimating 
these parts exports introduces an underestimation of the parts deficit. 
The U.S.-Japan Bilateral 1994 Automotive Trclcle Delicir 
the corporate goals and strategies of the automotive producers and the likely decisions of U.S. 
consumers. 
We develop two alternative scenarios because there are ample grounds for honest and 
reasonable disagreement among analysts on each of the many assumptions and arguments that 
underlie any particular scenario. The first scenario adopts those assumptions and outcomes we 
feel are the most likely to develop, without prior regard to or consideration of their influence on 
the size or composition of the trade deficit. This scenario constitutes a "Most Likely Case." 
The second scenario adopts those plausible assumptions and outcomes that would minimize the 
bilateral automotive trade deficit with Japan. This is the "Best Trade Case" from a deficit 
reduction perspective. The presentation of these two scenarios will not satisfy all readers, but 
it should narrow the grounds of debate. 
Direct automotive trade between the United States and Japan is composed of two 
primary categories of goods: finished or fully built-up (FBU) vehicle units; and parts and 
components. Both of these goods are important to the overall bilateral balance, but they exhibit 
different patterns and reflect different dynamics. As a result, separate analyses of these two 
major categories of automotive trade are performed in this study. The results of these analyses 
are then combined to produce an overall forecast of 1994 U.S.-Japan automotive trade. 
This study first examines trends and patterns in trade of finished vehicles between the 
United States and Japan. We estimate likely Japanese vehicle market shares in the United 
States, by segment, and then forecast the source of these segment sales from Japan and from 
US.-based Japanese transplants. Important considerations in this analysis include the likely 
use of captive imports and transplants by the traditional North American producers, and the 
export intentions of Japanese transplants themselves. The vehicle trade section of this study is 
a critical f i s t  step, not only for the purpose of estimating the likely vehicle deficit of 1994, but 
also in terms of providing information needed in the forecast of parts trade. Parts trade is 
analyzed in a separate section of the study. 
Standard multiple regression techniques are applied to parts trade data for the period 
1985-1990. These techniques permit the use of appropriate controls and corrections for 
measured quantities, and allow for a formal estimate of automotive imports into the United 
States from Japan. We analyze the 1985-1990 period because pre-1985 data are now less 
useful in developing a forecast model of parts trade for a future characterized by large volumes 
of transplant production, lack of U.S. government involvement in the Voluntary Export 
Restraint (VER) program, and increasing sales penetration by Japanese producers in large 
vehicle segments. The vehicles trade analysis provides several key forecast parameters in this 
estimation procedure, including transplant build levels in 1994. Since the growth trend in parts 
trade has recently been highly volatile, this section concludes with an examination of 
percentage changes in specific imported and exported products over the 1985-1989 period. 
The purpose of the product analysis is to detect any apparent patterns in specific parts and 
components that might inform the overall forecast of parts trade. 
We conclude with a special case study of the sourcing and trade content of a major 
Japanese transplant assembler in the United States. The trend in Japanese parts imports 
connected to transplant production is highly controversial. We selected a "leading" producer, 
in terms of its stated "domestic content" performance and the maturity of its production 
operations in the United States. By 1994, a number of transplant producers will have operated 
in the United States for a period of years, theoretically allowing their domestic sourcing to 
develop and mature. We perform this case study analysis in order to gain some insight about 
the likely trade effects of overall transplant production in 1994. The selected Japanese- 
affiliated assembler produced a large number of vehicles in the United States in 1990, and has 
been assembling vehicles in the United States for some time. An examination of the level of 
domestic sourcing exhibited by this transplant in 1989, and its sourcing patterns over time may 
tell us much about the likely future performance of other, newer Japanese transplant producers. 
Our analysis relies on three essential types of data. The first is government statistics. 
The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) and International Trade Administration (ITA) 
provided data on U.S. general automotive exports to and imports from Japan, including cars, 
trucks, and components. The ITC provided monthly data, corrected for the January, 1989 
conversion to "harmonized" codes for the calender years 1985 through September, 1990, or a 
total of 69 months. This monthly data set contains 61 parts categories and provides great detail 
on the import and export dollar values and vehicle quantities underlying the bilateral deficit. 
The ITA provided a separate list of annual dollar values for general parts exports and imports at 
an even finer level of detail (215 parts categories) for the calender years 1985-1990. Both the 
ITA and ITC vehicle and parts category lists are displayed in Appendix 11 and 111. 
The second type of data is the published estimates of the industry,media. Levels of 
actual monthly U.S. sales for the various trade categories of vehicles were collected from the 
annual Automotive New Market Data Book. Levels of traditional and transplant monthly U.S. 
production, by vehicle category, were taken from Ward's Automotive Reports for the January, 
1985 through September, 1990 period. 
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A third type of data is the information collected to perform the transplant sourcing case 
study. We use the most recent Foreign Trade Zone Board annual report information to 
determine the base levels of the transplant's parts markets and the value of its output. We then 
rely on several well regarded and comprehensive studies of the contribution of specific parts, 
components, and operations to vehicle unit cost to determine specific pans markets for this 
transplant's output. Finally, we use a variety of automotive parts sourcing directories, 
including our own internal directory of transplant parts suppliers,' to identify domestic 
suppliers to this transplant and determine its likely capacity for domestic sourcing. 
7 Brett C. Smith, J a ~ a n e s e  Automotive Su~ul ie r  Investment D i r e c t o ~ ,  Third Edition, Office 
for the Study of Automotive Transportation, Transportation Research Institute, The University 
of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1990. 
111. Trade in Motor Vehicles 
What will the bilateral vehicle deficit with Japan be in 1994? This section develops two 
automotive scenarios to propose alternative answers to this question. These scenarios detail 
vehicle imports from Japan and exports to Japan. They also estimate the U.S. build of 
Japanese-owned U.S. production facilities, and their exports to Europe, for use in Section IV's 
analysis of the parts deficit. These scenarios will then be linked to the bilateral automotive 
trade deficit, relying on procedures discussed in Section 11. 
These automotive scenarios require forecasting the 1994 sales goals, achievements, and 
sourcing patterns of the vehicle manufacturers, both Japanese and Big Three. We suspect that, 
in addition to normal business considerations, the "politics of trade" will influence the Japanese 
manufacturers' sales goals and sourcing plans. Therefore, our scenarios reflect our judgments 
of the political as well as business drivers influencing the 1994 market. 
We also must allocate these projected sales to domestic and foreign vehicle sourcing 
patterns. This is important because both Japanese and Big Three manufacturers will rely on 
import and domestically produced vehicles to meet their U.S. sales goals. Moreover, these 
sourcing patterns will influence not only the level of the vehicle deficit, but the composition of 
the overall bilateral automotive deficit, which reflects both vehicles and parts. While vehicle 
imports from Japan directly affect the size of the vehicle trade deficit, Japanese nameplate 
vehicles produced in the United States directly affect the size of the parts trade deficit. 
Japanese vehicles produced in the United States contain a higher proportion of parts imported 
from Japan than do Big Three vehicles. So even if the Japanese manufacturers substitute U.S. 
vehicle production for imported vehicles, it will not totally eliminate the value of foregone 
vehicle imports from the bilateral deficit. Rather, it will eliminate some of that value and shift 
some of it into the parts deficit. 
Seven Japanese vehicle manufacturers now have production capacity in the United 
States, and that capacity will reach about 2.5 million vehicles by 1994, as displayed in Table 1. 
Their combined sourcing patterns will be a powerful determinant of the level of parts imports 
from Japan. If they maintain high levels of Japanese import content as their U.S. production 
volumes increase, then imports of Japanese parts will correspondingly accelerate. If, on the 
other hand, these manufacturers increase their current levels of U.S. sourcing, then the rise in 
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parts imports will be smaller, even though volume increases will undoubtedly still result in 
some increase in total parts imports.* 
1994 Automotive Scenarios 
Table 1 
Announced 1994 Japanese Transplant Capacity Estimates 
for the United States 
Our two automotive scenarios present two possible 1994 markets, reflecting our 
assumptions and analyses of the corporate goals and strategies of the automotive producers and 
the likely decisions of U.S. consumers. The first scenario reflects our view of the "Most 
Likely Case," those assumptions and outcomes we feel are the most likely to develop. The 
second scenario adopts those plausible assumptions and outcomes that would result in the 
minimization of the bilateral automotive trade deficit with Japan, our view of the "Best Trade 
Case." While these two scenarios will not satisfy all readers, they should narrow the 
automotive terms of debate in reference to the 1994 bilateral automotive deficit. 










Figure 5 displays Japanese light vehicle unit sales in the United States from 1985 
through 1990, presenting import and transplants separately. Total Japanese sales receded after 
























*The bilateral deficit with Japan would also fall if the Japanese manufacturers shifted their 
sourcing for U.S. production from Japan to third countries, such as Malaysia or Taiwan, rather 
























1986, the largest vehicle sales year in U.S. history, but reached a new peak in 1990, although 
the size of the total light vehicle market fell about 15% compared with 1986. There has been a 
steady decline in vehicle imports, from just under 3.5 million in 1986, to about 2.3 million in 
1990, but this decline has been offset by a steady increase in transplant production, from under 
300,000 in 1986 to well over one million in 1990. The sourcing of Japanese sales has shifted 
rather substantially, falling from 91% import in 1986 to 61% import in 1990, as the Japanese 
manufacturers have brought U.S. production capacity on line. 
Figure 6 breaks out Japanese exports to the United States by type of vehicle. Car 
imports peaked in 1986, at just about 2.5 million, and declined to some 1.7 million by 1990. 
Light truck imports reached almost 1 million units in 1986, and fell to just under 600,000 in 
1990. Throughout this period passenger cars, as a percentage of total imports, have remained 
fairly stable, accounting for some 70% to 75% of total imports. 
+ Total Japanese Sales 
-+ Total Japanese Import Sales 
-A- Total Japanese Transplant Sales 
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Table 2 displays some statistics on the 1990 vehicle market and trade year, totalling 9.3 
million passenger vehicles and 4.6 million light trucks, including vans, trucks, and 
sports/utility vehicles. This market comprised three broad segments: small cars at 35% of the 
total, intermediates at 43%, and IargePuxury cars at 22%.9 
Figure 6 
Japanese Vehicle Imports into the U.S. 
1985-1990 
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Japanese imports, including captives retailed by the Big Three, amounted to some 1.7 
million sales, or 18.5% of the passenger car market, while Japanese production facilities in the 
9~i f fe r ing  segmentations of the market exist, reflecting weight, wheelbase, interior space, 
price, engine size, etc. and combinations thereof. We collapsed the segmentation scheme of 
Ward's Automotive Reports to the three categories (roughly small, middle, and largefiuxury). 
This segmentation emphasizes price and size, and permits the most direct conversion to the 
engine-based categories used in trade data. Examples would be Ford Escort and Tempo 
(small), Ford Taurus (intermediate), and Lincoln Continental (largefiuxury). Our earlier 
forecasts relied on a four-way segmentation of the vehicle market. We have reduced this to 
three-way to permit more ready transfer between these automotive market categories and the 
three-way classification approach relied upon for trade data. The conversions of this Table to 
trade classifications can be found in Table 1 of Appendix VII. 
United States accounted for another 1.5 million sales (14.5%), again including captive vehicles 
in this total. Thus Japanese manufacturers combined sales of U.S. and Japanese produced 
passenger cars reached about 3.1 million, or 33% of the passenger car market, up about six 
points since 1988. Japanese shares reached 50% in small cars, 38% in intermediates, and 
10% in largefluxury passenger cars. Japanese imports were predominantly small (51%), 
while 38% were intermediates, and 11% fall into the largelluxury segment. All U.S. 
production by Japanese manufacturers was in the small (57%) or intermediate (43%) market 
segments. 
It merits comment that the Japanese share of the largehuxury market has almost doubled 
in the past two years, moving from 5% to just under 10%. This vehicle category is extremely 
important for the trade deficit because these passenger cars have high customs values. While 
the Japanese manufacturers decreased their unit passenger car imports some 18% from 1988 to 
A 
Table 2 
1990 U.S. Sales of Japanese Vehicles 
(units in thousands) 
Passenger Car Market 
Light Truck Market 
Memo: The 1990 passenger car market equalled 9.3 million units. Of the 1990 market, 
transplants (like Figure 5, including some, but not all, Canadian vehicles and excluding Mexico) 
held 14.5% market share; and Japanese imports, 18.5%. The 1990 light truck market equalled 
4.559 million units. Of the 1990 light truck market, transplants (with no Canadian units) held 
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1990, from 2.1 to 1.7 million, they increased these high value imports some 89%, from just 
over 100,000 to just under 200,000, raising their share of Japanese imported cars from 5% to 
over 11%. This has protected the Japanese industry's revenue flow from the United States and 
prevented the dollar value of the bilateral vehicle deficit from falling proportionally to the 
decrease in import vehicles. 
Light trucks registered just under 4.6 million sales, or nearly 33% of the total 1990 
light duty vehicle market of 13.9 million. These included 588,000 Japanese imports, for a 
12.9% market share, and an additional 156,000 (3.4%) domestically produced Japanese 
nameplates, reaching a total Japanese manufacturer share of just over 16%, up about 1.5 points 
since 1988.10 
As discussed above, we forecast 1994 values through a combination of regression and 
accounting models. For vehicles, we project values by associating unit customs values, 
determined by our regression analysis of trade data, with the number of units predicted by the 
automotive scenarios. As displayed in Table 3, when these combined techniques are applied to 
"forecast" the 1990 trade deficit, the results are quite close (within 5%) to the actual figures for 
1990. These results provide some confidence in the usefulness of the overall method. 
We see the 1994 market as likely consisting of roughly 11.0 million passenger car sales 
and 5.0 million light trucks, reflecting expected growth as the economy recovers later in 
1991.1' This market maintains the current segment structure of the passenger car market and 
sets truck share at just over 31%. This market is consistent with other available projections. 
The key factors for predicting the vehicle trade deficit are the market share of Japanese 
imports, the level of vehicle exports to Japan from the United States, and the value of traded 
vehicles. The key market factor for projecting the parts deficit is the total number of Japanese 
vehicles produced here, and the domestic/offshore parts sourcing for those vehicles. This 
lowe exclude the Mazda Navajo, produced for Mazda by Ford at its Louisville, KY plant, 
from this calculation for the same reason that we include captive passenger cars manufactured 
by Japanese companies, but retailed by the Big Three: production share of sales is more 
directly related to the bilateral deficit, in both vehicles and parts, than is nameplate market 
share. 
llThe similarity of these projections to our earlier forecasts is not an accident. Those forecasts 
were predicated on an economic forecast that called for the economic downturn to develop in 
1990, and for 1991 to be the first year of the recovery. That downturn developed about one 
year later than that forecast, making 1994 equivalent in the economic cycle to the 1993 of those 
earlier forecasts. i 
section covers the 1994 market projections for both types of vehicles, although the tying of 
domestically produced vehicles to the parts vade deficit is covered in Section IV. 
The 1994 "Most Likely" Scenario 
Table 3 
1990 US.-Japan Vehicle Deficit 
Model Trade Case 
U.S. Import of Japanese Vehicles 
If the market develops as we think most likely, what would the bilateral automotive trade deficit 
be in 1994? The answer to this question requires the formulation of an automotive scenario for 
1994, conversion of that scenario to a customs categorization, and assignment of customs 







Corporate Strategies. Some analysts expect to see lower levels of Japanese vehicle sales in the 
United States. They argue that a resurgent Big Three will capture market share from at least 



































US.-Japan Vehicle Deficit 
Constant 
Billions of Dollars 
$ 0.587 
Constant 
Billions of Dollars 
1990 Actual 
Billions of Dollars 
$ 0.587 
Current 
Billions of Dollars 
U.S.-Japan Vehicle Deficit I $ 19.617 , $ 20.643 
Note: n.a. = not available 
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We see little on the horizon that suggests that the Big Three is likely to recapture market 
share from the Japanese. First, Big Three production share of the U.S. passenger car market 
continues to fall, shrinking another point from 1990: 1 to 1991:1, reaching 58.7% in the latter 
period. Second, while the Big Three appear to hold a price advantage over the Japanese 
manufacturers at this time, even that has not reversed their share erosion. Third, we see no 
evidence that the Big Three have succeeded in winning back significant numbers of younger 
buyers, or that first-time buyers are substantially increasing their preference for traditional 
domestic vehicles. Fourth, we do not feel that announced Big Three product offerings suggest 
that major shifts in these patterns are likely by 1994. To be sure, the Big Three have had 
products that met with encouraging market success, and undoubtedly will continue such 
achievements. However, these successes have been limited and focused, and primarily led to 
share shifts within the Big Three. None have yielded the sustained and broad appeal that 
recaptured market share from the Japanese manufacturers. 
Moreover, the Japanese manufacturers have often gained share during market 
downturns, then held near that share gain as the market recovered. We know of no persuasive 
evidence that suggests that their 1991:l share gains will prove temporary as the 1990/1991 
downturn ends. Rather, we think it likely that the Japanese manufacturers will adjust their 
product offerings, building on their time-to-market advantage, and pursue price strategies as 
necessary to preserve current share levels. 
The increased competitiveness of the Big Three will more likely show itself in a 
reduced share of the U.S. market held by European importers. To be sure, some of the 
Japanese manufacturers may experience share loss. The smaller manufacturers, like S u b m  
and Daihatsu, certainly could experience severe difficulties by 1994. However, we expect that 
any share losses they experience will more likely go to the major Japanese players, like Honda 
and Toyota than to the Big Three. Moreover, GM shows no evidence of decreasing its reliance 
on Isuzu and Suzuki, and the success of GM's Geo strategy suggests GM will probably 
increase its sourcing from its Japanese affiliates as the market turns up, While Chrysler has 
decreased its captive imports from Mitsu bishi, that may simply provide Mitsubishi the vehicles 
it needs to expand its dealer network and to pursue share more aggressively under its own 
nameplate. 
On the other hand the U.S. manufacturers are becoming more competitive, both in price 
and quality, so increases in Japanese share will not come as readily as they have in the past. 
What kind of market will 1994 bring, and what will be the pattern of Japanese sales? 
We think Honda will fight fiercely to defend its increased share of the U.S. market, 
which reached 9.2% for 1990. While the media has concentrated attention on Honda's sales 
decline during 199 1: 1, Honda has managed to increase its share over 1990: 1, moving from 
8.2% to 8.8%. We think that Honda will be hard pressed to increase its share beyond the 1990 
levels, but see little reason to expect Honda share to fall. 
On the other hand, we think that Toyota will undertake a concerted effort to replace 
Honda as the number one Japanese passenger car nameplate in the United States, perhaps 
increasing from its 1990 8.4% share to about 10%. We think that Toyota will seek to have its 
leadership position in the Japanese industry reflected in its sales position in the world's largest 
market. Moreover, we think that Toyota has the human and financial resources to accomplish 
this. 
Nissan is a bit of a puzzler, managing to take only 5% of the U.S. market, trailing 
Honda badly, although Nissan substantially outsells Honda in both Japan and Europe. We 
think Nissan will aggressively pursue market share increases, but are not persuaded that they 
will be successful. Nissan has managed to recover some earlier share losses in Japan over the 
past few years, but that success has not carried over to the U.S. market. Nissan's share in 
1991:l fell to 4.4%, from 4.8% in the comparable quarter of 1990. 
We believe that Mazda and Mitsubishi will make serious efforts to increase their 
production share of U.S. sales. If their captive sales through Ford and Chrysler, respectively, 
fall off, we are confident that they will seek to expand their own nameplate sales. Mazda had 
very good years in Japan and Europe in 1990, and we expect their U.S. performance to follow 
suit. Mitsubishi has been increasing its share in Japan over the past few years, and has 
enormous resources behind it. Taking these factors into consideration, we think it is likely that 
these two companies will increase their combined U.S. market share by about 1 point by 1994, 
whether through captives or under their own nameplate. 
Subaru has faced serious market problems the past few years, and we expect this to 
continue. The fates of Isuzu and Suzuki are largely in the hands of General Motors, and we 
expect GM to increase its sourcing from these affiliates as the market turns up. Daihatsu 
remains at peril because of its small volumes and low VER quota These companies could well 
lose about 1.5 points of their 1990 4.2% share of the U.S. market. Nevertheless, if they 
should lose share, it almost certainly will be to other Japanese companies. 
The US. -Japan Bilateral 1994 Aufomotive Trode Deficit 
We believe that these company scenarios, or any number of other likely scenarios 
developed on the basis of corporate performance and strategies, suggest that the Japanese 
manufacturers will probably increase their combined share by about one point, to just under 
34% of the passenger car market. In fact, they might gain even more, perhaps as much as 
three points, but we think that is less likely. 
Passenger Car Sourcing. Many analysts anticipate that the expected Japanese manufacturers 
increases in U.S. production will substitute for import vehicles. We are much less sanguine 
that the Japanese manufacturers will substitute transplant production for imports. To date, only 
Toyota shows evidence of following this strategy, and decreases in the import activity of other 
producers, notably Nissan, are more readily explained by difficulties in a falling market. 
Undoubtedly some substitution will occur, but we do not expect it to reach substantial levels. 
We believe that most, if not all, Japanese manufacturers will continue to resist 
substituting transplant production for imports from Japan. Their production base in Japan 
must run at or near planned capacity to maintain its efficiency and to provide employment for 
the home workforce. While market growth elsewhere in the world may absorb some of the 
output currently targeted to the United States, we do not think it will be sufficient to redirect a 
major portion of that output. Moreover, the Japanese manufacturers stress the independence of 
their American operations, and resist analyses that treat these facilities as "~apanese,"l2 and 
link their production to import levels. 
We assume that 2.3 million vehicles, the current VER limit, continues to represent the 
Japanese manufacturers' preferred level of passenger car exports to the U.S. market. We 
believe that domestic U.S. production represents additional sales, rather than import 
substitutes, in the strategies of the manufacturers. To be sure, all these manufacturers would 
like to see imports fall. However, we think each of them hopes that their competitors will 
provide the decrease, while their own strategies and goals call for fairly high levels of exports 
to the United States. There are two reasons why continued high levels of vehicle exports from 
1*1t is interesting to note that the Japanese "Big Three" appear to have followed quite different 
strategies during 1991:l in response to the passenger car market downturn. All three have 
experienced sales losses compared to 1990: 1, although Honda (- 11.5%) and Toyota (-13.2%) 
have outperformed the market (- 17.5%), while Nissan has underperformed it (-25.1%). Both 
Honda and Toyota have experienced greater sales declines for their U.S. produced cars than 
for their imports, 13.4% vs. 9.2%, and 20.0% vs. 8.0%, respectively. Nissan shows the 
reverse pattern, with an increase of 21.0% for U.S. produced cars, and a decrease of 36.7% 
for imports. We feel that this reflects different sales strategies, at least partially grounded in 
differing concerns with protecting levels of production in the United States and Japan. 
Japan are likely. First, they will be required to meet the Japanese manufacturers' U.S. market 
share targets. Second, they will be needed to meet goals for Japanese production volumes. 
We simply do not see these manufacturers surrendering significant U.S. export sales 
and balancing that production loss in Japan from exports elsewhere. This is especially the case 
in light of the capacity added in Japan over the past few years. Toyota, for example, has 
announced its intention to manufacturer 10% of the world's motor vehicles by 1995, and no 
credible strategy exists for achieving that without substantial increase in its share of the U.S. 
market. While Toyota might increase its U.S. production beyond its announced and rumored 
capacity plans, it still must maintain production volumes at home to ensure efficient capacity 
utilization and worker cooperation. And that means continued exporting of vehicles to the 
United States. 
Nevertheless, the Japanese manufacturers will not have totally unrestricted choice of 
Japanese or U.S. sourcing of vehicles, They will need to maintain production in both 
countries, and will find themselves constrained by other developments. For example, some of 
these companies may reach a "natural" market ceiling, some will find themselves constrained 
by product allocation decisions, and most will face economic and political pressure to maintain 
substantial levels of U.S. production. These levels will have to be sufficient to ward off 
charges that U.S. operations are simply extra capacity that can be idled or closed when market 
conditions warrant. 
We think that Japanese passenger car exports to the United States are likely to remain at 
roughly their current volume levels, and, thus, capture a decreased market share as the 1994 
market grows by some 18% over the 1990 market. This would lower their 1994 share by 
about three points. We thus see a stronger Japanese performance than many, calling for sales 
of about 1.7 million Japanese exports in the 1994 U.S. market, but at a substantially lower 
market share-about 15.5% --of that 11 million passenger car market. 
We think that the transplants will be successful, with most operations selling at or 
above their rated capacities. That raises their sales to about one million vehicles in each of the 
small and intermediate segments, for a total transplant sale just above two million passenger 
cars. Transplant share will thus reach 18.4%, and total Japanese share will reach 33.9%, up 
about one point from 1990. Total Japanese passenger car sales will reach 3.7 million, up from 
3.1 million, or some 22% as the market increases by 18%. 
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However, our scenario suggests that the sourcing of those sales will change 
substantially. The Japanese manufacturers' passenger car sales in the 1990 market were 56% 
imports and 44% domestics. Our 1994 scenario calls for 46% imports and 54% domestics. 
Even though the 1994 vehicle imports will represent a richer mix, the constant dollar value of 
vehicle imports will almost certainly not rise; and even if the domestic content of the ttansplants 
increases, the value of parts imports will almost certainly increase. Thus, the vehicle share of 
the total bilateral deficit will likely decrease, while the parts share increases. 
We think that the Japanese will continue to move aggressively upscale and capture 
larger shares of the intermediate and, especially, the 1argePuxury segments. The Japanese 
product plans clearly call for more intense emphasis on the largebuxury segment than on the 
intermediate segment. We also expect them to continue to enjoy success in this segment, as 
Honda and Toyota have notably achieved. The Japanese U.S. facilities will continue to 
produce small and intermediate cars, so we expect a substantial shift in the segmentation of 
Japanese imports. We see 1994 Japanese imports at 44% small, 27% intermediate, and 28% 
luxuryflarge. This is a much richer value mix than the 1990 mix. 
Light Trucks. Mazda, Nissan, and Toyota are committed to being "full-line" manufacturers, 
and will compete aggressively in the light truck market. Mazda and Toyota compete 
successfully in both compact pick-up trucks and vans, and Nissan continues to seek an 
effective entry in the van segment. Isuzu and Daihatsu are perhaps stronger in this segment 
than they are in passenger cars. 
However, the Big Three have clearly been more successful in the light truck market 
than in the passenger car market, whexher that reflects the 25% tariff on most Japanese light 
trucks or the superior performance of the Big Three. Nevertheless, we see Japanese share in 
this important segment increasing by 1994, probably to about 22% of the light truck market. 
Again, Japanese strategies and the importance of this vehicle segment suggest that the Japanese 
manufacturers will aggressively target growth in this segment. The competitive strength of 
these manufacturers should provide them the means to reach such a level, although at this time 
we feel a "natural" market limit in light trucks will remain considerably below that limit in 
passenger cars. 
To reach a 22% market share, Japanese light truck exports to the U.S. market will 
probably increase rather than decrease, and 1994 exports might exceed 600,000. This would 
be an increase of about 3.5% over 1990, and account for just over 12% of the market. The 
more competitive orientation in this market is likely to limit the transplants to about 500,000 
light truck sales, another 10% of the market. Total Japanese light truck sales and share, then, 
would be somewhat over 1.1 million light trucks, or about 22% of the market.13 
Table 4 displays this 1994 market.14 Figure 7 expands Figure 5 and presents the 
sourcing of total Japanese vehicle sales for this 1994 market in the context of 1985 through 
1990. Figure 8 displays 1994 Japanese imports of cars and light trucks, again in the context of 
1985-1990 imports. Japanese share of the U.S. total light vehicle market rises to just above 
30%, up from about 27.5% in 1990. 
13We expect initial production of the oft-rumored Toyota fullsize pick-up truck to appear later 
in the 1994 sales year. 
1 4 ~ h e  conversions of this Table to trade classifications can be found in Table 2 of Appendix 
VII. 
Table 4 
1994 U.S. Sales of Japanese Vehicles: "Most Likely" Market 
(units in thousands) 
Passenger Car Market 
1994 U.S. Sales of Japanese Light Trucks: "Most Likely" Market 
Memo: The 1994 passenger car market equals 1 1.0 million units. Of the 1990 market, tranplants 
(including some Canada) hold 18.4% market share; and Japanese imports, 15.5%. The 1990 
light truck market equals 5.0 million units. Of the 1990 light truck market, transplants (with no 
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Figure 8 
Japanese Vehicle Imports into the United States 
1985- 1990 and 
Most Likely 1994 Forecasts 
(thousands of units) 
-C- Japanese Vehicle Import Sales-Most Likely 
+ Japanese Car Imports-Most Likely 
+ Japanese Truck Imports-Most Likely 
U.S. Vehicle Exports to Japan. Japan stands out from other major automotive producing 
nations more in its low level of import sales than in its high level of export production.15 
Automotive exports to Japan face numerous informal trade barriers that make the Japanese 
market quite expensive, by international standards, to penetrate. Factory control over dealers is 
much stronger in Japan than in the United States, so the Big Three cannot readily persuade 
Japanese dealerships to carry Big Three products. It is extremely costly to establish an 
independent dealer network, and it is unlikely that U.S. sales in Japan would justify these 
investment costs by 1994. It is possible that the U.S. manufacturers will secure expanded 
market access through their Japanese affiliates, although this may be a longer-term proposition. 
150n the other hand, the U,S, industry stands out more for its low export share of production 
than for its high level of imports. That is one reason for concern that any market openings that 
develop in Japan will benefit the European industry more than our own. 
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The import share of the Japanese passenger car market has increased substantially over 
the past few years, and totalled about 5% (about 224,000 vehicles) in 1990. U.S. imports 
accounted for nearly 29,000 sales in 1990, 12.8% of all import sales, or about 0.6% of the 
total market. Vehicles produced by the Big Three captured over 13,000 sales, or roughly 47% 
of U.S. vehicle exports, and 6% of all imports. 
While most analysts expect some decline in the 1991 Japanese market, as has 
developed in 1991:1, they expect strong growth in the 1992 through 1994 time frame, reaching 
a passenger car market of about 4.8 million. We think that pressure on Japan to open its car 
market further will continue, and import share might well reach 7.5% by 1994, or some 
360,000 vehicles. Certainly the Japanese government and industry are in a position to relax 
some of the non-tariff, economic, and informal barriers to the Japanese market, and we think it 
is likely that they will. 
Further, we think it likely that traditional U.S. manufacturers will increase their share 
of all imports to about 11%, or 39,000 vehicles, simply because we cannot construct a credible 
scenario that calls for such overall import increases without substantial Big Three increases. 
Too many of the current imports to Japan, especially the European luxury cars, are probably 
already close to their natural market limits. For the Big Three to reach 11% of Japanese 
imports requires them to maintain their current share over the expanded import market, and 
capture some 13% of the balance of import growth. We think this is quite possible, assuming 
that Japan's import market share does increase, and that the Big Three pursue that opportunity. 
We see a level of "symbolic" exports by the transplants. We expect that the Japanese 
manufacturers will export some 50,000 vehicles from their U.S. production facilities to Japan, 
up from just over 15,000 in 1990. Since some Japanese vehicles will only be produced in the 
United States, some of this export activity will reflect sourcing to support product offerings in 
Japan. Some of the export activity will reflect political concerns, including the Japanese 
manufacturers' concerns both with being "good citizens" and demonstrating that vehicles can 
indeed be exported to Japan. 
If the transplant manufacturers export 50,000 vehicles to Japan, the combined 
traditional and transplant exports would reach 89,000. This represents our "Most Likely" 
estimate for vehicle exports, reflecting our belief that the Japanese are indeed serious about 
further market opening in automobiles. We see continued negligible export of light trucks to 
Japan, based on the characteristically different light truck styles and uses in the two markets. 
Figure 9 displays our estimate of the unit light vehicle exports from the United States to 
Japan in 1994 and provides the actual levels for 1985 through 1990 for comparison purposes. 
We also expect the Japanese manufacturers to export about 35,000 vehicles to Europe from 
their U.S. facilities, primarily to establish their "U.S." identity for trade purposes. Two years 
ago we expected these exports to be much higher, perhaps reaching 100,000. Our thinking has 
changed, largely because the U.S. Trade Representative has already clearly announced the 
position that these vehicles are indeed U.S. vehicles. We believed then that the Japanese 
manufacturers would seek relatively large exports to Europe to increase the trade value to the 
United States of adopting such a position. Since the United States already has adopted this 
position, we expect the level of exports to be lower, reflecting more normal product allocation 
decisions, while maintaining some floor of exports to exercise and ensure the principle of U.S. 
rather than Japanese origin for these vehicles. 
Figure 9 
U.S. Vehicle Exports to Japan 
1980-1985 and 
Most Likelv 1994 Forecast 
Sources: International Trade Administration, OSAT 
Of course, Japanese exports to Europe from the United States do not directly affect the 
bilateral deficit with Japan. However, they have an important indirect effect because these 
vehicles contain significant parts imports from Japan. They constitute part of the U.S. build by 
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Japanese manufacturers, and must be taken into account for our analysis of the parts deficit in a 
later section. 
This scenario, then, calls for some 89,000 vehicle exports from the United States to 
Japan, and these directly enter the calculation of the bilateral vehicle deficit. It also calls for a 
Japanese build of 2.1 1 million passenger vehicles in the United States, composed of 2.026 
million U.S. sales, 50,000 exports to Japan, and 35,000 exports to Europe. Adding 500,000 
light trucks yields a total Japanese build of 2.616 million units. 
The 1994 "Most Likely" Vehicle Deficit 
Our "Most Likely" scenario calls for the 1994 vehicle deficit displayed in Table 5. In 
constant dollars, the vehicle import bill increases 0.5%, to $21.3 billion, while the current 
dollar increase is just over 20%, reaching $25.6 billion.16 Vehicle exports pass $1.5 billion 
constant dollars, up over 260%, and $1.8 billion current dollars, an increase of over 300%.17 
Subtracting vehicle exports from imports leaves a U.S. deficit of just under $19.8 billion 
constant dollars, down some 4% from 1990, or about $23.7 billion current dollars, some 15% 
higher than 1990. 
For a number of reasons, we think this custom values forecast may be somewhat on the 
conservative side. First, trade data is organized by engine size, rather than vehicle price. Our 
estimation procedure assumes that there is no change in the average customs value of vehicles 
within each category of engine size. That is, we simply multiply our predicted number of 1994 
units within a category (Column 1) times the 1990 average customs value for that category 
(Column 2) to arrive at our forecast of the constant dollar 1994 deficit (Column 3) for that 
category. However, we think that it is unlikely that these customs values will in fact remain 
constant. This is because we strongly expect the Japanese manufacturers to import an enriched 
mix of vehicles, as presented in Table 4. Some of that enrichment will occur within the engine 
categories used for customs value, and thus is not reflected in our forecast. For example, 
vehicle imports in 1994 are likely to include more option-loaded and higher-priced 6 cylinders, 
but these are estimated at the current average value for 6 cylinders. 
16We forecast a 19.8% increase in Japanese custom value import price, from September, 1990 
through September, 1994 to adjust our estimates to 1994 current dollars. A discussion of our 
method for the estimation of change import price is in Appendix V. 
17We assume a 4.5% annual increase in U.S. automotive export prices for the period 1990- 
1994 to estimate the current dollar level of U.S. automotive exports to Japan. 
Second, the customs values reported for light truck imports in 1990 are quite low 
compared to the values associated with 4 cylinder passenger cars. We are unsure why these 
reported values are so low, but think it likely that they too may rise by 1994.~8 Third, our 
export scenario may indeed prove to be optimistic, since it assumes that the Big Three will avail 
themselves of the possible export opportunities that we think may develop. 
An increase in customs value either within passenger car categories or for light trucks 
would, of course, increase our constant dollar estimate of the vehicle import bill, while a lower 
level of exports would decrease the estimate of export earnings. Either of these developments 
would increase the vehicle deficit. 
Table 5 
1994 U.S.-Japan Vehicle Deficit 
"Most Likely" Trade Case 
U.S. Import of Japanese Vehicles 
' 8 ~ e  do not think that the values of these vehicles is underreported because they are subject to 
a 25% tariff, since we assume the Customs Service performs audits on these vehicles. It is 
more likely that there is some sort of underestimate due to data problems, such as the possible 









































U.S.-Japan Vehicle Deficit 
Constant 
Billions of Dollars 
$ 1.547 
U.S.-Japan Vehicle Deficit 
Current 
Billions of Dollars 
$ 1.845 
Constant 
Billions of Dollars 
$ 19.790 
Current 
Billions of Dollars 
$ 23.712 
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The 1994 "Best Trade" Scenario 
Our "Most Likely" scenario portrays our best judgment of what is likely to develop by 
1994, and reflects our analysis and assumptions across a wide range of possible developments. 
Of course, any elaborate scenario runs the risk of error, so we also have developed a second 
scenario. This "Best Trade" scenario provides readers a more optimistic view of 
developments, and assesses its likely effect upon the bilateral automotive deficit with Japan. 
While neither scenario will exactly coincide with most readers' own preferred scenario, 
providing two does offer readers the opportunity to assess the likely magnitude of the effect of 
substituting their own. 
For our "Best Trade" scenario we specifically created a scenario that would minimize 
the bilateral deficit. We reviewed our "Most Likely" scenario, asking how developments might 
differ in ways that would reduce the deficit, but not be so unlikely as to totally strain credulity, 
Thus, we do not think it at all plausible that Japanese manufacturers will voluntarily reduce 
vehicle imports to one million units or so; nor do we deem it credible that the United States will 
increase exports much above 150,000 units. Our intention is to describe a possible, but more 
optimistic, scenario. 
Corporate Strategies. If neither government, nor the Japanese industry itself is likely to 
restrain Japanese vehicle exports to the United States, then any such reductions will have to be 
competitively forced by the Big Three. What are the prospects for enhanced Big Three 
competitiveness? What developments might lead to reduced Japanese import and/or transplant 
share of the U.S. auto market? 
As discussed above, the Big Three have enormously improved their comparative 
quality performance, and now trail the Japanese fleet by less than half a defect per vehicle, 
down from about six defects per vehicle in 1980. Moreover, they appear to hold a price 
advantage against the Japanese, and that should eventually influence the market. We think it is 
critical that the Big Three break through the negative view of their vehicles' styling and value in 
the eyes of so many younger buyers. While we do not expect them to make major inroads on 
these fronts by 1994, we could be wrong. Perhaps some of their new vehicles will achieve 
higher market acceptance than we think likely. It is possible that GM's Saturn, for example, 
will appeal to younger buyers, and help break the image of a rather stodgy Big Three fleet held 
by many of these customers. 
Moreover, the performance of the Japanese manufacturers might be weaker than we 
think likely. They certainly have made mistakes in the U.S. market, and they do not always do 
as well as analysts expect. The minivan segment provides illustrations of both these points. 
After a number of failures, Nissan is turning to a cooperative venture with Ford to enter this 
segment, and Mazda's and Toyota's entries, while good vehicles, have posed little threat to 
Chrysler's domination of this segment. 
While we think it is most likely that Honda will maintain its 1990 market share, it is 
plausible that it will slip a bit by 1994. After all, Honda has a relatively limited range of vehicle 
offerings, and no light trucks. If any of their vehicles falter in the market place, they could lose 
share if only because they lack sufficient alternatives within their own line. Honda customers 
are also customers for light trucks, and to the extent that they purchase and like these vehicles, 
other manufacturers have a chance to win even satisfied car customers from Honda. Taking 
these arguments into consideration, it is plausible that Honda might lose a point of market share 
by 1994. 
We still think that Toyota will make every effort to surpass Honda passenger car sales 
in the U.S. market, but this may require reaching only some 9% of the passenger car market, 
up a half point over 1990. While the Lexus, Toyota's luxury entry, has received rave reviews 
and enjoyed a good first year, its sales for 1991:l fell much more sharply than did Honda's 
Acura line. Perhaps Lexus will not provide the image to take Toyota as far as we think likely. 
Nissan, as we indicated, is difficult to predict, so we leave their 1990 share at 5%. 
Mazda might only increase its market share marginally, perhaps well under one point. 
Mitsubishi may lose captive sales through Chrysler and face difficulty in garnering those sales 
for its own nameplate. Its share loss would still be small, perhaps balancing Mazda's gain. 
These companies, then, collectively hold their current shwe under this scenario. 
Subaru might continue its market share slide, perhaps falling to as low as 0.596, and 
selling few vehicles beyond its transplant output. While we do not think it likely, GM might 
lessen its reliance on Isuzu and Suzuki for small passenger cars, and that might lower their 
combined share to just about 1% in passenger cars. Daihatsu's negligible share might hold, or 
even disappear. These "little four" lose substantial market share under this scenario, and the 
Big Three, rather than other Japanese nameplates, benefit. 
Passenger Car Sourcing. Under this scenario, Japanese passenger car sales increase some 7% 
over 1990, reaching just under 3.3 million units. However, Japanese share falls some 3 
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points, to just under 30% of the U.S. passenger car market. We see the same ratio of imports 
to transplants supplying this U.S. demand for Japanese vehicles in this scenario as we portray 
in the "Most Likely" case. That yields some 1.5 million imports and just under 1.8 million 
transplant sales. 
We also think it is plausible that the Japanese makers will be less successful in the 
luxury segment than we expect. After all, the Japanese are relatively new entrants in this 
segment, and their early success may be difficult to expand. We still expect them to increase 
their segment share, but a smaller expansion, to just over 12% is certainly plausible. This 
would further restrain the dollar value of Japanese imports, as they continue to be more 
concentrated in smaller vehicles. 
Light Trucks. Our "Most Likely" scenario calls for Japanese light truck sales to increase from 
16% to 22% of the market, based on the expectation that they would pursue this segment very 
aggressively and successfully. One could certainly argue that, unless the tariff is dropped, the 
Japanese manufacturers will continue to be less aggressive in this segment. It is also plausible 
to argue that their weaker performance in trucks than in passenger cars is a direct reflection of 
how Japanese vehicles competitively compare with the Big Three's. We still would argue that 
some increase in share is likely, simply because of the importance of this segment in the overall 
market, and the profits it yields to the manufacturers. But that increase plausibly could be on 
the order of two points, rather than the six points of our "Most Likely" case. Our best case 
scenario calls for 400,000 light truck imports and another half million transplant sales, for an 
18% share of the market. 
Table 6 displays our plausible, "Best Trade" case for the 1994 U.S. market.19 
Japanese sales increase to just below 4.2 million vehicles, up about 10% from some 3.8 
million in 1990, as Japanese share of the total light vehicle market falls just over a point, to 
about 26%. Transplant sales reach just under 2.3 million units, up almost 42%, while import 
sales fall to 1.9 million, down almost 18% from 1990. Proportionately more of the decrease in 
imports comes in the truck category, falling about 32%, compared with the car category, which 
falls about 13%. 
U.S. Vehicle Exports to Japan. Our "Most Likely" scenario calls for 89,000 unit exports to 
Japan, 50,000 from transplant operations and 39,000 from the Big Three. How might these 
l%e conversions of this Table to trade classifications can be found in Table 3 of Appendix 
VII. 
3 4 
increase? We have suggested that the most plausible, even if not likely, political development 
that would influence the bilateral deficit is the Japanese government taking action to further 
encourage vehicle imports into Japan. 
If such "market opening" actions are undertaken, and if Japanese sales in the U.S. 
market are on the order of our "Best Trade Case" scenario, then we might see the transplant 
export as many as 80,000 vehicles to Japan. This would represent a good faith effort, and 
provide some cushion for U.S. production facilities. 
It is plausible, although again we think not likely, that the Big Three would export 
another 10,000 vehicles to Japan above our "Most Likely" scenario, raising their total exports 
to 49,000. This would require them to maintain their current market share of imports to Japan, 
and capture 2096, rather than 13%, of the balance of import growth. Again, this scenario relies 
on both Japanese efforts to lower barriers, and Big Three pursuit of any such opportunities. 
Table 6 
1994 U.S. Sales of Japanese Vehicles: "Best Trade" Market 
(units in thousands) 








1994 U.S. Sales of Japanese Light Trucks: "Best Trade" Market 
18.0% 
Memo: The 1994 passenger car market equals 11 .O million units. Of the 1990 market, 
transplants (including some Canada) hold 16.2% market share; and Japanese imports, 13.6%. 
The 1990 light truck market equals 5,000 million units. Of the 1990 light truck market, 
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This scenario calls for a total U.S. vehicle export to Japan of almost 130,000 units. 
This is a difficult target to reach, and we think less likely than the 89,000 of our "Most Likely" 
case, but it is within the realm of plausibility. We think 35,000 transplant exports to Europe is 
a useful estimate. Transplant build should reach 2.397 million, made up of 1.782 million U.S. 
passenger car sales, 80,000 exports to Japan, 35,000 exports to Europe, and 500,000 U.S. 
light truck sales. 
The 1994 "Best Trade Case" Vehicle Deficit 
What does this "Best Trade CaseVsuggest about the likely bilateral automotive trade 
deficit in 1994? Our "Best Case" scenario calls for the 1994 vehicle deficit displayed in Table 
7. In constant dollars, the vehicle import bill decreases about 17%, to $17.7 billion, while the 
current dollar falls under 1% to $21.2 billion. Vehicle exports pass $2 billion constant dollars, 
up over 350%, and pass $2.5 billion current dollars, an increase of over 400%. Subtracting 
vehicle exports from imports leaves a U.S. vehicle deficit of just about $15.4 billion constant 
dollars, down some 25% from 1990, or about $18.5 billion current dollars, some 10% lower 
than in 1990. 
. 
Table 7 
U.S.-Japan Automotive Vehicle Deficit: 
"Best Trade" Case 












































U.S.-Japan Vehicle Deficit 
Constant 
Billions of Dollars 
$2.242 
Constant 
Billions of Dollars 
Current 
Billions of Dollars 
U.S.-Japan Vehicle Deficit I $ 15.441 / $ 18.494 
A 
This scenario, then, calls for a substantial improvement in the US.-Japan bilateral 
vehicle trade deficit by 1994. A reduction of some 25% in four years is indeed impressive. At 
the same time, it leaves the United States facing a still major and important deficit, and still far 
from balanced trade. 
Discussion 
Figure 10 displays the forecast vehicle deficits under each scenario, providing again the 
data from 1985 through 1990 for interpretive context. Both these scenarios call for a reduction 
in the vehicle deficit, although both scenarios call for increased total light vehicle sales by the 
Japanese. Our more optimistic, "Best Trade Case" sees a reduction in the vehicle deficit of 
over 24%, while our more likely scenario forecasts a reduction on the order of 4%. 
+ U.S.-Japan Vehicle Deficit (constant $) 
+ US.-Japan Vehicle Deficit-Most Likely (constant $) 
+ U.S.-Japan Vehicle Deficit-Best Case (constant $) 
4 
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The "Best Trade Case" calls for reduced imports, while the "Most Likely Case" 
forecasts a negligible increase. Both call for increased unit vehicle exports from the United 
States to Japan, with the "Best Trade Case" forecasting 40,000 more exports than does the 
"Most Likely Case." 
The important mechanism, in each scenario, is the cross-over in the preponderance of 
the supply of Japanese vehicles from imports to U.S.-produced transplants. In the "Most 
Likely Case," increased Japanese sales and share as the market recovers is almost completely 
supplied by additional transplant production. In the "Best Trade Case", Japanese sales 
increase, although Japanese share falls somewhat, and transplant production not only supplies 
the increase, but substitutes for some 400,000 current import units. 
This crossover in vehicle sourcing, then, is critical to vehicle deficit reduction. Neither 
of our scenarios calls for a substantial rollback in Japanese nameplate sales, and such scenarios 
today lack the little credibility they enjoyed through the mid-1980s. So the sourcing of these 
vehicles represents the only plausible avenue to substantial reductions in Japanese vehicle 
exports to the United States. At the same time, the rather extraordinary efforts required to raise 
U.S. vehicle exports to the level of our "Best Trade Case" scenario suggests that, whatever its 
merits may be in other sectors, an export solution offers little realistic possibility for bilateral 
vehicle deficit reduction. 
However, that cross-over to greater sourcing from U.S. production raises another 
deficit issue. Whatever benefits it may provide in reducing the vehicle deficit, it is likely to 
exacerbate the bilateral parts deficit The Japanese transplants heavily source parts from Japan, 
so increased transplant build almost inevitably will mean an increase in parts sourcing from 
Japan. We now turn to consider the role of parts trade in the overall bilateral automotive deficit 
with Japan. 
IV. Trade in Parts and Components 
Automotive parts trade between the United States and Japan became considerably more 
complex during the 1980s. Japanese parts exports to the United States totaled $1.3 billion in 
1980, $4.6 billion in 1985, and peaked in 1989 at a level of $1 1.6 billion. U.S. parts exports 
to Japan totaled only $97 million in 1980, $203 million in 1985, and peaked in 1990 at $893 
million. This consistent imbalance is all the more interesting when we consider that the United 
States possessed the largest automotive parts industry in the world in 1980. In fact, prior to 
1980, the U.S. automotive parts industry had been the largest in world capacity for many 
years. In addition, the 1980s can hardly be described as a period when U.S. suppliers 
suffered from excess demand for any significant period of time. Probable causes for the rise in 
Japanese exports of automotive parts to the United States are examined below. Probable 
causes for the low level of U.S. automotive exports to Japan, however, are considerably more 
difficult to discern, and we do not comment on these matters at any great length. 
We assume there are three essential sources of demand, or "income" variables, for 
Japanese imported automotive parts. First, Japanese parts are imported for use in the repair 
and servicing of the operating fleet of Japanese-affiliated vehicles in the United States, referred 
to as Japanese aftermarket demand. Second, Japanese produced parts and components 
are imported for installation into Japanese transplant vehicles assembled in the United States. 
We refer to this source of parts imports simply as transplant demand. Finally, Japanese 
produced parts are imported into the United States for installation into traditional North 
American produced cars and trucks. We refer to this type of demand as "Big Three" or 
captive import parts demand. Other, more minor sources of demand for Japanese 
imported parts might include parts reexported to other countries for production or aftermarket 
purposes, and aftermarket parts for Japanese components installed in traditional North 
American vehicles. 
This section proceeds with a statistical forecast of U.S.-Japan automotive parts trade in 
1994. Japanese exports of automotive parts are estimated using a special multiple regression 
model. U.S. exports of parts to Japan are simply trended through 1994. The two estimates 
are combined to produce a forecast of automotive parts trade between Japan and the United 
States. This forecast is followed by an analysis of percentage change trends in automotive 
parts exports and imports by parts category. 
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A Statistical Model of Japanese Automotive Parts Imports 
Information concerning the three major sources of demand for imported Japanese parts, 
in combination with a relative price series, can estimate a demand function for Japanese 
imported parts useful for forecasting future import levels. Unfortunately, a specific Japanese- 
U.S. price series for automotive parts does not exist and cannot yet be constructed.20 The 
yen/dollar exchange rate provides a crude substitute for relative price. However, that variable 
performed poorly in analysis.21 We forecast Japanese parts exports to the United States, then, 
using information on the three income variables, or sources of demand, listed above. 
Dependent Variable. We use ITC monthly levels of total Japanese exports to the United States 
of automotive parts as our "dependent variable." We generally use the 69 months of data from 
January, 1985 through September, 1990. The dollar amounts are "inflated" to September, 
1990 levels through the use of a producer price index. Monthly observations allow us to use 
the maximum number of cases to estimate the relation between vehicle production in the U.S. 
and Japanese parts imports. Seasonal fluctuations are successfully corrected in the estimation. 
However, monthly data tends to suppress the influence of "structural" influences or feedback. 
Such influences may be important over the long run and an estimation model developed with 
monthly data may tend to hide interdependent effects. Finally, monthly data posed a serious 
challenge in terms of constructing monthly equivalents for certain information available only in 
annual form. 
Complete coverage is a major concern in using the ITC monthly data. There is no 
guarantee that the "automotive" categories of imports or exports listed by the ITC constitute 
100% of actual motor vehicle related commodity trade between the United States and Japan. In 
fact, the 1989 total, provided by the ITA, for Japanese automotive parts imports is $890 
million higher than that provided by the ITC ($12.457 billion versus $1 1.566 billion). If this 
2 0 ~ h e  International Price Program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of 
Labor produces a quarterly price index for imported motor vehicles and equipment and parts. 
But this index applies to all imports, regardless of source. A specific, quarterly price index for 
Japanese automotive imports into the United States is not produced. Since a large portion of 
automotive trade is carried out by U.S. domestic firms with their subsidiaries in Canada and 
Mexico, the overall automotive import price index reflects, to a large extent, domestic pricing 
by U.S. f m s ,  making this price series useless for either trade or competitive analysis of U.S.- 
Japanese automotive trade. We can think of no greater assistance or contribution our 
government can make to the further understanding of U.S.-Japanese automotive trade, and the 
competitive standing of our domestic auto industry, than to produce a specific, bilateral price 
index series for Japanese imports of auto~notive products into the United States. 
2 1 ~ e e  the discussion in Appendix IV. 
8% gap is consistent and meaningful, many of the effects we identify in our analysis below 
may be underestimated or biased. In truth, we are not entirely confident that the ITA figure is 
itself reliable or generally inclusive. However, the ITC provides monthly levels and we use 
these data for our analysis. Our concerns reflect the current sorry state of critical, industry- 
level U.S. trade information, a situation which has only worsened since the "conversion" to 
harmonized codes in January, 1989. 
Afrermarket Demand. We assume that aftermarket demand for Japanese imported parts is 
related to the growth and total size of the Japanese-affiliated operating vehicle fleet in the 
United States. The U.S. Department of Commerce estimates the total U.S. retail market for 
aftermarket parts and components in 1990 at $75 billion,2? or $426 per operating car or truck 
in the United States in 1989. Many Japanese vehicle aftermarket parts are heavily sourced 
from Japanese original equipment and primary suppliers in Japan, and this relationship has 
been reported in prior studies. Past studies, however, have consistently underestimated future 
levels of operating Japanese vehicles in the United States, because their forecasts were based 
on serious underestimates of future Japanese sales levels and gains in market share. This 
source of forecast error would tend to reduce the corresponding estimate of the Japanese- 
affiliated vehicle aftermarket in the United States, and thus the level of Japanese imports 
attributable to this source of demand. 
We obtained annual estimates of the U.S. operating fleet of passenger cars, as of July 
1, for 1980-1989. Figure 11 shows that the Japanese share rose from 8.3% of all operating 
passenger cars in the United States in 1980, to 13.6% in 1985, and peaked at 18.2% in July 
1989. The Japanese fleet rose from 8.7 million in 1980, to 15.6 million in 1985, to peak at 
22.4 million in 1989. Thus, Japanese passenger cars in operation in the United States grew at 
an annual compound rate of 9.6% during the 1985-1989 period. For this analysis, we 
transformed annual incremental change in the Japanese operating fleet into monthly incremental 
change by distributing the annual increase across the months of each year, based on weights 
derived from monthly Japanese sales (transplant and import). Since the latest year for which 
we had fleet data was 1989, our direct measurement of the effect of Japanese fleet size on 
Japanese exports of parts to the United States cover 54 months: January, 1985 through July, 
1989. We were unsuccessful in obtaining comparable information on Japanese truck and van 
units in operation in the United States. 
221991 U,SS Industrial O ~ ~ t l o o k ,  International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., January 1991, p. 37-1 1. 
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Figure 11 
Japanese Cars in Operation and 
Japanese Percentage of Cars in Operation 
1980-1989 
-4%- Japanese % of All Cars in Operation 
Source: Polk Statistics 
Transplant Demand. Assembly of motor vehicles in the United States by Japanese automotive 
firms, independently or in joint venture with traditional producers, demonstrated remarkable 
growth during 1985-1990. Transplant production rose from essentially zero units produced in 
1982 to a level of 361 thousand in 1985, and then rose by 217% to 1.145 million units in 
1989. In 1990, Japanese transplant production rose by an additional 21% to 1.390 million cars 
and trucks.23 The absolute percentage increase in transplant production, then, for the 1985- 
1990 period was 284%, or an annual compound growth rate of almost 31%. The figures refer 
to only Japanese vehicles assembled in the United States. In fact, if Canadian and Mexican 
23This number is lower than the transplant sales figures in prior figures and tables. Those 
figures likely include some carry over 1989 production and some, as eariler indicated, 
Canadian production. 
production is included, over 1.6 million North American Japanese transplant vehicles were 
sold in the United States in 1990, or some 41% of total Japanese vehicle sales. 
Japanese producers in the United States felt they had little choice but to import a 
significant portion of the parts and components used in their early production. Many experts 
expect this portion to fall as both the length of time and volumes of U.S. operations and 
production increase. There are four distinct explanations for why Japanese transplant 
producers would tend to shift their sourcing to higher U.S. domestic content over time: 
9 It requires time, perhaps years, to construct an efficient network of domestic 
suppliers for components and parts. This is especially true if the assemblers 
insist on customer-supplier relations and Japanese manufacturing techniques 
similar to those existing in Japan. The process of increasing domestic content 
would also take considerable time if the goal were to source primarily to 
Japanese-affiliated suppliers with facilities in the United States. These 
"keiretsu" suppliers would need time to set up their own U.S.-based 
operations. As the "domestic maturity" of the transplant assemblers increase, 
domestic content in their vehicles should rise. Yet, if the Japanese continue to 
add new facilities and assembly plants to their U.S. operations, the average 
domestic maturity of their operations will only slowly increase. A 
considerable portion of Japanese operations in the United States remain 
dependent on Japanese imported parts and components, as long as they add 
capacity to their operations at current rates. 
Many parts and components can only be efficiently produced at large volumes. 
Such U.S.-based production, whether performed by traditional U.S. or 
Japanese-affiliated suppliers, could not be performed at efficient economies of 
scale in the early, low-volume phases of transplant operations. As volume 
increases over time, however, domestic content should rise when these 
efficient scale levels are reached. Figure 12, from a Japanese research study, 
poxtrays a stylized account of these economies of scale for various parts and 
components. However, only three Japanese vehicle manufacturers are 
expected to reach volumes above 300,000 unitslyear in North America 
(Honda, Toyota, Nissan) by 1994. In fact, as Figure 13 shows, despite the 
recent growth of total Japanese production in the United States, the average 
"company level" of production voli~me per year has remained consistently 
below 200,000. Many of the transplants only plan to produce at volumes far 
below efficient scale levels for many parts and components. 
Some experts believe that the Japanese method of motor vehicle production is 
based largely on localized production of parts and components, maintaining 
that parts production in close proximity to vehicle assembly is an essential 
requirement of the "lean" or "Toyota production system." The just-in-time 
(JIT) system, a tradition of highly interdependent manufacturers and 
suppliers, concerns about the reliability and costs of long supply lines, or 
even the uncertainty of currency exchange rates, should promote the increased 
sourcing of domestic content. Yet, the Japanese also hedge centralized 
production across regional markets worldwide, allowing them to avoid 
problems such as serious regional overcapacity or coordinating a dispersed 
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production system. Moreover, long supply lines have never proven to be a 
serious obstacle to Japanese exports of any product to anywhere. 
+ Finally, some expect the Japanese to increase domestic content in their U.S. 
produced vehicles to clearly differentiate them from imports in political terms. 
However, political yardsticks are rarely accurate in economic matters, and the 
Japanese in the mid-1980s gained enormous political credit for U.S. assembly 
of vehicles that contained 70-80% Japanese content. Fairly minimal increases 
in U.S. content may meet their political objectives for the 1990s. An 
additional question concerns the type of parts and components that are, and 
will be, sourced to domestic suppliers, It is possible for a vehicle producer to 
retain "high margin" or high value-added production within the firm or the 
"affiliated" supplier network. This charge of "dualism" has been leveled at 
Japanese vehicle producers, and implies a consistent pattern of transplant 
sourcing of highly profitable parts from Japan or U.S.-based keiretsu 
affiliates, while sourcing less complex, low margin parts and components to 
traditional U.S. automotive parts producers. Assembler "domestic content," 
it seems, only measures a portion of the trade and economic effects of 
transplant production. 
We can answer many of the issues regarding the influence of transplant production on 
Japanese exports of parts to the United States simply with an efficient estimate of Japanese 
parts content contained in an average transplant, and how this content has changed over time. 
Our statistical monthly model of Japanese parts imports includes total Japanese U.S. transplant 
production for the period January, 1985 through September, 1990. The lowest production 
level was February, 1985 at 23,220, and the highest, August, 1990 at 123,548. Other, more 
complex issues can only be addressed through careful case study analysis of major Japanese 
operations in the United States. We attempt to cover some of these additional concerns in our 
case study of a large and experienced Japanese transplant producer. 
Captive Parts Imports. The Big Three used Japanese imported components in their 
domestically assembled vehicles throughout the 1980s. These components typically included 
various engines or manual transaxles, or other subcompact or compact car and truck 
components not yet produced by domestic manufacturers. The Big Three maintains 27 of the 
35 assembly plant U.S. foreign trade zones, and recently has sourced products such as air 
conditioners or die-cast aluminum parts to U.S.-based Japanese partsmakers. Our model 
attempts to measure this source of demand directly by including monthly Big Three production 
levels of U.S.-built cars and trucks for the period January, 1985 through September, 1990. 
The basic model to estimate Japanese imports, then, is the following: 
Japanese Exports of = F(Japanese Operating Fleett, U.S. 
Transplant 
Automotive Partst Productiont, Big Three Productiont) 
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Figure 13 
Total Transplant Production vs. 
Average Per Transplant Company 
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Parts Imports Estimation Results 
A large number of specifications were tested for the best fit of the model. The details of 
that investigation are fully discussed in Appendix IV. Two final specifications were chosen for 
analysis: one using Japanese operating car fleet values for 54 cases from January, 1985 
through July, 1989, the "fleet model," and one using all 69 available cases, but substituting a 
linear time trend for the fleet variable, the "linear trend model." There is a strong degree of 
intercorrelation between all three of the explanatory variables. In fact, the degree of negative 
intercorrelation between Big Three vehicle production and transplant production is so severe 
that one of the two variables had to be dropped to produce efficient coefficients. We elect to 
keep transplant production in our general forecast estimation model and drop Big Three 
production. As a result, this analysis does not permit a separate estimate of Big Three demand 
from aftermarket demand. We do estimate the rate of Big Three demand separately. 
Our 54-case, "fleet" model zssociates $3,034 of parts imports with each transplant unit 
built. No significant change in this effect exists for any period through July, 1989. The same 
estimation produced a fleet coefficient for imports of $55.21 per operating Japanese passenger 
car per month. This implied, annual value of $662.52, might include the effects of aftermarket 
imports for operating Japanese trucks as well, and is corrected somewhat by a significant 
negative intercept term. A separate estimation that substitutes Big Three production for 
transplant production produces a highly significant Big Three coefficient for Japanese parts 
imports: $166.45 for each Big Three car or truck produced in the United States. 
The "linear trend model," with 15 additional cases, provides alternative data and 
estimates. This estimate of the level of parts imports per transplant for the period 1985-1989 is 
$3,223. However, there is a significant interaction term that implies a decline of $1,542 in this 
effect for the first nine months of 1990. In other words, parts sourcing from Japan remained at 
a consistent $3,223 per transplant unit through the end of 1989, and then fell to $1,681 during 
the first nine months of 1990. We assume that this drop in import sourcing was heavily 
influenced by increased domestic or third country sourcing, especially at two specific transplant 
engine/transaxle facilities. A separate estimation that substitutes Big Three production for 
transplant production produced a significant Big Three coefficient of $149.36 of Japanese 
imports per Big Three car or truck produced in the United States. 
Forecast of Japanese Parts Imports in 1994 
We make four separate forecasts of Japanese parts exports to the United States in 1994. 
We use the "linear t r end  model to perform our estimations, largely on grounds of superior 
performance in estimation. Our "Most Likely" scenario forecast reflects a level of imports we 
think is probable based on estimation results and certain assumptions. Our "Best Trade Case" 
scenario reflects our estimation of the lowest level Japanese exports to the United States might 
plausibly reach in 1994, although we feel this level is not likely. Both of the two scenarios are 
forecast in constant and current dollars. Constant dollars refer to prices that held in September, 
1990. Current dollars reflect price increases we estimate for September, 1994. The rate of 
inflation for Japanese imported auto parts is the same as forecast for Japanese imported 
vehicles, about 19.8% for 1990-1994. The method of how this price effect was reached is 
described in Appendix V. 
The linear trend estimation that includes transplant production and excludes Big Three 
production is selected as the forecast model of Japanese parts imports for this study. We do 
not consider the 1990 transplant effect coefficient of $1,681 per transplant build appropriate for 
our "Most Likely" forecast because it is based on only nine months of 1990 data. We have 
other objections, discussed below, to this result. We do, however, use this level of Japanese 
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imported parts content in our "Best Trade Case" scenario, matched with the "Best Trade Case" 
scenario for U.S. transplant production developed in the Section 111. 
The "Best Trade Case" vehicle uade forecast of 1994 Japanese transplant build is 2.397 
million cars and trucks. This level is multiplied by an average of $1,681 of imported parts per 
transplant vehicle assembly, as in the first nine months of 1990, generating $4.029 billion in 
imported Japanese parts due to transplant demand. The model also forecasts a total of $13.081 
billion in imported parts shipments due to combined aftermarket and Big Three demand. The 
constant dollar total in this "Best Trade Case" scenario is $17.1 1 billion in parts imports, or 
51% higher than the 1990 total of $11.35 billion. Our estimate of the current dollar "Best 
Trade Case" is $20.49 billion in parts imports, some 81% higher than the 1990. 
Our "Most Likely Case" vehicle trade forecast of 1994 total build is 2.61 1 million. 
This level is multiplied by an estimated average of $3,223 per transplant vehicle to generate 
$8.415 billion in imported Japanese parts due to transplant demand. This is a considerably 
higher level for transplant demand than that forecast in the "Best Trade Case." This higher 
level is partly due to an additional build of 129,000 transplant vehicles in the "Most Likely 
Case" versus "Best Trade Case" scenarios. However, the major reason for the difference in 
the two dollar levels is the assumption of $3,223 in per unit parts imports in our "Most Likely 
Case" versus the $1,681 per unit assumed in the "Best Trade Case" scenario. In effect, we are 
assuming a higher level of transplant Japanese parts and component content in the "Most Likely 
Case" scenario. We make this assumption because we do not believe domestic sourcing, on a 
per-unit basis, can increase so dramatically in a period during which transplant production rises 
by over 1.2 million units. Our reasoning for this assumption is explained both later in this 
section and in the transplant case study analysis. 
The "Most Likely" forecast also includes an additional total of $13.081 billion in 
imported parts shipments attributable to combined aftermarket and Big Three demand. The 
constant dollar total in this "Most Likely Case" uade scenario is then $21.49 billion in parts 
imports, or 89% higher than the 1990 total of $1 1.35 billion. Our estimate of the current dollar 
"Most Likely Case" is $25.74 billion in parts imports, or 127% higher than the level 
experienced in 1990. 
In summary, we forecast a level of $17.1 1 billion in constant dollar imports of auto 
parts in our "Best Trade Case" 1994 forecast, and a level of $21.49 billion in our "Most Likely 
Case" 1994 forecast. These constant dollar estimates are shown in Figure 14. A rough 95% 
confidence interval associated with these two estimates calls for a range of plus or minus $1.5 
billion around the total annualized point estimate. We also forecast a level of $20.49 billion in 
current dollar imports of auto parts in our "Best Trade Case" 1994 forecast, and a level of 
$25.74 billion in our "Most Likely Case" 1994 forecast. These current dollar estimates are 
shown in Table 8. 
+ Japanese Parts Imports into U.S. (constant $) 
-0- Japanese Parts Imports into U.S.-Most Likely (constant $) 
-4- Japanese Parts Imports into U.S.-Best Case (constant $) 
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Exports of Automotive Parts to Japan 
Table 8 
U.S.-Japan Automotive Parts Deficit: 
Two 1994 Scenarios 
(in billions of dollars) 
"Best Trade Case" 
U.S. Import of Japanese Automotive Parts 
In constant 1990 dollars, exports of auto parts from the United States to Japan grew 
from a level of $185.5 million in 1985 to $893.4 million in 1990. The constant dollar annual 
compound rate of growth for 1985-1990 was about 37%. We found remarkable consistency in 
this annual growth rate regardless of the period used for compounding (e.g., 1980-1990 or 
1988-1990). A simple trend forecast based on the 1985-1990 annual growth trend yields a 
constant dollar level of exports of $3.145 billion for 1994. We use this level of parts exports 
to Japan in both our "Best Trade Case" and "Most Likely Case" scenarios to derive the U.S.- 
Japan parts and total automotive trade accounts in 1994. A 1994 current dollar forecast of 
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exports of parts to Japan is produced by simply applying a 4.5% annual price increase to the 
1994 constant dollar estimate. Both the current and constant dollar estimates of 1994 parts 
exports to Japan are shown in Figure 8. We do have some concerns about patterns in U.S. 
parts exports to Japan, however, based on our inspection of percentage changes in specific 
parts trade categories. These concerns are discussed below. 
The 1994 US.-Japan Auto Parts Deficit 
The 1994 parts deficit is calculated by subtracting the constant and current dollar level 
estimates of U.S. exports of parts to Japan from the "Best Trade Case" and "Most Likely 
Case" levels of estimated imports from Japan into the United States. We forecast, then, a 
constant dollar parts deficit of $13.97 billion for the "Best Trade Case," or a 
34% increase from 1990. Our current dollar "Best Trade Case" parts deficit is 
$16.74 billion, or a 60% increase in current dollars from 1990. It should be 
remembered that the "Best Trade Case" scenario of the parts deficit was premised on an 
extremely low level of expected transplant-unit sourcing. Despite that assumption, the parts 
deficit forecast still increases by 1994. 
Our "Most Likely Case" 1994 parts deficit in constant dollars is $18.35 
billion, a 75% increase from the 1990 level. In current dollars, the expected 
deficit rises to $21.99 billion, or a 110% increase from 1990. 
The constant and current dollar "Best Trade Case" and "Most Likely Case" scenarios 
for the U.S.-Japan auto parts deficit are given in Table 9, while constant dollar forecasts are 
shown in Figure 15. 
Table 9 
U.S.-Japan Automotive Parts Deficit: 
Two 1994 Scenarios 
(in billions of dollars) 
"Best Trade Case" 
U.S.-Japan Automotive Parts Deficit 
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Figure 15 
U.S.-Japan Automotive Parts Deficit 
1985-1990 and 
Best Trademost Likely 1994 Forecasts 
(in millions of constant 1990 dollars) 
+ U.S.-Japan Parts Deficit (constant $) 
+ U.S.-Japan Parts Deficit-Most Likely (constant $) 
+ U.S.-Japan Parts Deficit-Best Case (constant $) 
Discussion 
It is useful to consider further the possible contributions of the various sources of 
Japanese import parts demand to total parts imports, combining results from separate 
estimations. It is also appropriate to discuss likely future levels of transplant vehicle content 
based on these results and additional information available to this study. 
Tables 10 and 11 provide some detail to separate the relative contribution of Big Three 
captive parts demand from demand for Japanese aftermarket parts. We combined the two 
sources in our above forecast for a total constant dollar estimate of $13.081 billion in both our 
"Most Likely Case" and "Best Trade Case" scenarios. In Table 10, we list the per-unit 
contributions to import parts demand estimated for the production of transplant and Big Three 
traditional content vehicles for the years 1989, 1994 ("Best Trade Case") and 1994 ("Most 
Likely Case"). In Table 11 we list the levels of Japanese parts imports we attribute to each 
source of domestic assembly. In 1989, for example, we attribute $3.69 billion in Japanese 
parts imports to transplant assembly of 1.14 million at $3,223 per unit built in the United 
States. An additional $1.43 billion of Japanese parts imports are attributed to the production of 
9.614 million Big Three traditional content, U.S.-built cars, trucks and vans at $149 per unit 
assembled. 
The difference between $5.29 billion of Japanese parts imports attributable to transplant 
or Big Three production and 1989 total Japanese parts imports of $1 1.57 billion is a residual of 
$6.28 billion. We attribute the bulk of this residual to Japanese vehicle aftermarket demand. 
Based on this figure, a 1989 level of over 22.4 million Japanese affiliated cars in operation 
would produce a per unit aftermarket demand ratio of $287 per car in operation (CIO). This 
level is comparable to a 1985 U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) estimate of 1988 
Japanese aftermarket sales per vehicle in  operation of $260.24 Our figure would be a bit 
higher because of our necessary exclusion of figures for operating Japanese trucks. The 
USDOC figure is meant to reflect retail pricing, however, which should be corrected for at least 
a 60% markup collected by the retail distributor. On the other hand, the USDOC study figure 
is given in 1982 prices, perhaps half the level of prices that held in 1989. 
Table 10 
Expected Per Unit Source Effects: 
1994 Japanese Parts Exports to the United States 
(constant 1990:9 dollars) 
24Autornotive Parts Industry and the U.S. Aftermarket for Jauanese Cars and Light m, 
Automotive Affairs and Consumer Goods, International Trade Administration, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Washington D.C., March 1985, p. 67. 
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Table 11 attributes almost 32% of 1989 Japanese parts imports to transplant demand, 
almost 14% to Big Three demand, and well over half to the aftermarket for Japanese affiliated 
vehicles. The levels and contributions of these sources of demand are projected for our two 
1994 scenario forecasts. In the "Best Trade Case," imported parts meant for transplant 
production rise only 9% from their 1989 level, to $4.03 billion, and the transplants' share of 
parts imports falls below 24%. Big Three imports rise to $1.48 billion, and their share falls to 
less than 9%. Imported aftermarket parts rise to $1 1.6 billion and a 68% share of total parts 
imports. The "Best Trade Case" reflects our most positive trade effect assumptions about U.S. 
Big Three and transplant build levels and the low $1,681 Japanese content level assumption for 
transplants. 
Our "Most Likely Case" scenario calls for imports of parts meant for transplant 
production of $8.41 billion, a 128% increase from 1989, and an increase in total import parts 
share to over 39%. Big Three demand, on the other hand, falls to $1.39 billion and a share of 
less than 7%. This scenario reflects a much higher production level for transplant production 
as well as a larger transplant content of $3,223, as well as lower share and build levels for the 
Big ~ h r e e . ~ 5  Once again, the Japanese aftermarket calls for $1 1.6 billion in Japanese parts 
Table 11 
1994 Japanese Parts Exports to the United States 
(billions of constant 1990:9 dollars 
250ur best trade case Big Three 1994 sales level for light vehicles is 11.14 million, and our 
most likely estimate is 10.492 million. We assume the 1990 U.S. Big Three build to U.S. Big 
Three sales ratio of .89 will hold in 1994. Thus, our best case Big Three build estimate is 






























imports. A rough estimate of the Japanese level of U.S. CIO is 37 million by 1994 (if we use 
1985-1990 growth rates). This would work out to $314 of Japanese imported aftermarket 
parts per CIO in 1994. 
The apparent size and growth of aftermarket demand for imported parts in the exercise 
above is remarkable. Yet this source of demand for imported parts has received relatively little 
attention from the media or academia, compared with transplant demand. Even in constant 
dollars, our forecast calls for an 85% increase in Japanese exports of aftermarket auto parts to 
the United States for 1989-1994. If the 1989 estimate of $281 per CIO reflects average annual 
demand for such parts over the typical 12 year life of a Japanese car, the sum $3,372 
($281*12) would exceed our estimate of imported parts needed to produce a transplant in the 
United States ($3,223) by almost 5%. It is clear that Japanese affiliated vehicles, 
whether imports from Japan or transplants assembled in the United States, 
generate significant dollar imports and contribute to trade deficits for years 
after they are sold. 
The increasing importance of aftermarket imports in US.-Japan bilateral 
automotive trade may have strategic implications. Both Japanese and German vehicle 
importers have pursued a strategy of substituting fewer units of high-priced large cars for many 
units of lower-priced small cars. The number of units drops considerably, to the importers 
possible political benefit, while sales and profit dollar levels for vehicle imports remain 
constant, or even climb. This "leapfrog" strategy also protects import vehicle manufacturers 
somewhat from the wide swings in the value of the U.S. dollar, because of the large margins 
present in luxury cars. 
Aftermarket parts also carry large margins in the market, much like luxury cars. 
Increased local sourcing of parts and components for domestic assembly can confer similar 
political benefits to those attained from declines in imported vehicles. A large portion of 
aftermarket parts from Japan in the total import mix would also protect Japanese traditional 
suppliers from swings in the dollar and still yield the bulk of inherent profit in the production 
of parts. The Japanese may use the aftermarket as their luxury-car or "leapfrog" 
strategy equivalent in parts trade. 
Table 10 can also be used to generate a rough approximation of transplant sourcing in 
1989. This speculation, illustrated in Table 12, is meant to inform the preliminary case study 
analysis in Section V. We start by assuming that the average custom value of a Japanese 
import vehicle in 1989, $9,189, is roughly equivalent to the average manufacturing value of 
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their U.S. transplant vehicles. Thus, 1.145 million transplant vehicles would be worth $10.52 
billion in customs value. 
We continue by assuming a level of $3,223 worth of Japanese imports parts per 
transplant built in 1989, or $3.69 billion for 1.145 million transplant assemblies. Japanese 
imported parts constitute, then, 35.1% of transplant customs value, whether they are shipped 
directly into the assembly plant trade subzone or through domestic parts suppliers. 
Our OSAT transplant directory lists a total of 222 Japanese-affiliated parts facilities 
operating in the United States by 1989. We estimate that these facilities employed an 
impressive total of 50,615 that year. In 1988, U.S. firms in SIC 37 14 (motor vehicle parts 
and equipment manufacturing) produced an average level of $71,685 of value added per 
employee. If we inflate this figure by 4.5% (to $74,911) and apply it to our estimate of 1989 
Japanese-affiliated parts employment in the United States, we can arrive at a generous level of 
$3.79 billion for the maximum domestic capacity of these producers in 1989. Perhaps 10% of 
the output of these firms is actually sold to Big Three producers for use in their traditional 
content vehicles. We assume that the remaining 9b%, or $3.41 billion, is shipped eventually to 
transplant assembly plants. About 32.4%, then, of the customs value of transplant production 
is attributable to this source. 
A critical assumption is the likely share of domestic content produced directly within the 
transplant assembly plants themselves. This share reflects a portion of vehicle profit and 
Table 12 
1989 Japanese Transplant Sourcing in the United States 
Source 
Total Customs Value 
Imports from Japan 
Japanese Parts 
Facilities in the U.S. 
Transplant Assembly, 
and OverheadIProfit 
Traditional U.S. Parts 
Producers and Other 












overhead, as well as the value of stamping and assembly manufacturing performed in the 
plants. 
Three recent sources are used to project an average for this share of about 20.0%.*6 This 
sourcing estimate receives additional attention in our transplant sourcing case study. Our 20% 
assumption would assign $2.1 billion of transplant customs value to the U.S.-based, Japanese 
manufacturers themselves. 
The final residual sourcing category in Table 12 remains for traditional U.S. auto parts 
producers and imports of parts from third countries. About $1.32 billion or 12.5% of the 
$10.52 billion in customs valuation is attributed to traditional U.S. parts suppliers and non- 
Japanese parts imports. The net share for traditional domestic parts producers, of course, is 
less than the full 12.5%. 
Our simulation of 1989 transplant sourcing can bring some understanding to the 
potential of future domestic sourcing by Japanese motor vehicle firms in the United States. 
Our "Most Likely Case" vehicle trade scenario calls for a transplant build of over 2.6 million 
units in 1994, almost 1.5 million higher than in 1989. Given our most probable content level 
of of $3,223 per unit, Japanese imports of parts and components for 1994 transplant 
production would more than double from the 1989 level of $3.7 billion, to over $8 billion. 
The sourcing levels in Table 12 would also more than double. For example, parts sourcing to 
Japanese facilities in the United States would increase by 128% to $7.8 billion. 
If, however, domestic content is dramatically increased by Japanese transplant 
producers to a level that reflects a ratio of only $1,681 of imported parts per unit, Japanese 
producers will need to source an additional $4.3 billion in parts to U.S. sources of supply. 
Table 12 reflects a 72% share of 78% of non-assembly plant U.S. sourcing to Japanese owned 
parts facilities in 1989. Given this pattern, an additional $3.4 billion of the new domestic 
260ne source was: Mazda Motor Manufacturing (USA) Corporation, "Foreign Trade Subzone 
70i, Annual Report to the Greater Detroit Foreign Trade Zone, Inc. October 1, 1987 to 
September 30, 1988," contained in the Annual R e ~ o r t  of the Greater Detroit Foreign-Trade 
Zone Inc. &. TO for fiscal vear ended September 30. 1989. A second estimate is contained in 
"The Impact of changing the Rule of Origin Content Requirements for Automotive Products 
under the United-States-Canada Free Trade Agreement from 50 to 60 Percent," A Report to the 
Automotive Select Panel, Booz-Allen, New York, 1990. A third source is contained in a 
Statistics Canada estimate, supplied by the Canadian Auto Parts Manufacturing Association to 
the Automotive Select Panel, of the percentage breakout of passenger cars by cost and profit 
category. 
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sourcing would accrue to the Japanese affiliated parts producers, raising their total 1994 
capacity needs for transplant production alone to over $1 1 billion. 
We cannot foresee, at this time, an increase in the capacity of Japanese owned parts 
facilities by 1994 to a level of over $1 1 billion in value added. This would require a Japanese- 
affiliated U.S. automotive parts sector made up of 634 facilities employing 147,000. In 1989- 
1990, the Japanese added 17 new parts facilities and about 2,000 employees to their U.S. 
base. Current rates of Japanese expansion in the United States, then, will not provide the 
needed capacity. The large shortfall must either be imported from Japan, as in 
the past, or sourced to U.S. traditional or third-country suppliers. 
In our f i s t  study of the US.-Japan automotive deficit we noted that transplant 
domestic "CAFE-content" levels beyond 75% (perhaps 61-62% manufacturing content) were 
highly unlikely. Higher levels would require the Japanese producers to maintain separate 
import and domestic fleets for CAFE performance purposes. We still believe that the 75% 
break-point content level is a serious obstacle or ceiling to higher levels of domestic sourcing 
for these vehicles. The maintenance of separate fleets highly complicates strategic decisions on 
the sourcing of complete vehicles and parts. This would especially be true for Japanese f m s  
that source large numbers of vehicles from both Japan and their plants in the United States. 
For this reason, and for the capacity limitations outlined above, we see domestic content for 
these vehicles rising slowly through 1994 to reach a level, at best, just below 7596, in CAFE- 
content.27 
Trends in Percentage Changes in Imports and Exports of Parts 
The ITA supplied annual import and export automotive trade levels for 215 parts 
categories for the years 1985-1989. We performed some simple percentage change 
calculations, based on these annual data, for the very specific ITA parts trade categories. Our 
intent is to identify patterns in the types of parts that are traded, and the relative rates of change 
in trade for specific parts. 
Types of U.S. Automotive Parts Imports from Japan 
The ITA data show Japanese exports of automotive parts to the United States rising 
from $5.2 billion in 1985 to $12.5 billion in 1989, an absolute percentage increase of 138%. 
27This analysis also makes us skeptical that the value of imported parts fell to $1,681, for that 
would mean that the transplants are averaging almost 82% domestic content. None of these 
operations claim to be above 75% in 1990. 
The annual compound growth rate for total parts imports from Japan, then, was about 24%. 
We computed the same percentage change figures for each of the 215 ITA import parts 
categories and found a surprising degree of variance in growth rates across the categories. We 
grouped various parts categories by levels of percentage change relative to the total average 
change for all parts. The full results of this exercise are listed in order of 1985-1989 
percentage change in Appendix VI. At least three large groups of parts merit discussion here. 
There was a large number of new or fast growing imported parts from Japan. We 
defined these parts categories as those that increased by 275% or more (twice the average 
increase) in dollar exports to the United States during 1985-1989. In fact, a number of these 
part or component types were not even listed in 1985-1988, and only make their appearance 
with the new, harmonized coding in 1989. If we ignore this source of confusion, however, a 
general pattern for types of fast growing imports can be discerned. 
The upper portion of Table 13 gives a sample listing of fast growing parts imports. 
These parts generally fall into three large categories: complete engines, high value-added parts 
and su~assemblies for large components, and high-margin aftermarket parts. We assume that 
the complete engines are sourced to both transplant and Big Three assembly plants. It is also 
likely that the component parts are being shipped to new Japanese-affiliated component 
facilities in the United States that sell to both transplant assemblers and the Big Three. 
The remarkable growth of these parts cannot be explained just by the 217% increase in 
transplant assembly production or the 50% increase in the Japanese CIOs in the United States 
during 1985-1989. Percentage increases of over 275% for these parts can only mean that they 
are necessary inputs into the rapidly growing Japanese affiliated automotive parts sector in the 
United States. The transplant parts makers increased their operations in the 1986-1989 period 
at a very rapid pace, and have only recently slowed their additions to capacity. Many of the 
parts that make up the fastest growing categories of imports during 1985-1989 are clearly 
meant for use in the assembly of final components in these U.S. facilities. 
A second group of parts imports increased at a medium or near average rate during 
1985-1989. We defined these parts categories as those that increased by 67 to 274%. In 
general, imports of these parts can be explained by growth in transplant production and the 
Japanese aftermarket. Items such as wheels, starters, fuel and water pumps, or ball bearings, 
then, reveal no important change in their sourcing patterns. 
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An interesting group of import parts are those that exhibited relatively slow or even 
negative growth in shipments to the United States in 1985-1989. As shown in Table 13, we 
define these parts categories as those that grew by 66 to -81%. Some components, such as 
carburetors, declined due to technological displacement (by fuel injectors in the case of 
carburetors). Other low value-added items such as jacks, seat belts, or various plastic parts 
were no doubt sourced to domestic producers. The low value of these parts reflects partially 
their low technology requirements, as well as low profit content. After the decline of the dollar 
against the yen in 1985-1987 it became less efficient to export these parts from Japan. 
We are not surprised that a number of large components, such as transmissions or 
complete engines still show large growth in shipments from Japan to the United States. Even 
by 1990, only two of the eight transplant assemblers were manufacturing engines and 
transmissions in the United States. Yet, imports of several large components, such as 
complete air conditioners, did decline in in the 1985-1989 period. This positive development is 
clearly offset, to a certain extent, by fast growing imports of high-value sub-assemblies, such 
as air conditioner compressors, during the same period. 
Types of U.S. Automotive Parts Exports to Japan 
The ITA data show U.S. exports of automotive parts to Japan rising from $216 million 
in 1985 to $625 million in 1989, an absolute percentage increase of 189.0%. The annual 
compound growth rate for total U.S. parts imports, then, was about 32%. We computed the 
same percentage change figures for each of the 215 ITA export parts categories and found an 
even larger degree of variance in growth rates across the categories than was the case for U.S. 
imports from Japan. Once again, we grouped various parts categories by levels of percentage 
change relative to the total average change for all parts. The full results of this exercise are 
listed in order of 1985-1989 percentage change in Appendix VI. Two large groups of parts 
merit discussion here. 
We define very fast growing parts exports to Japan to include types that increased by 
377% (twice the average percentage increase) or more during 1985-1989. A sample listing of 
these parts is shown in the upper portion of Table 14. Many of the same parts and components 
that fell into the slow or negative growth group of parts exports from Japan to the United States 
reappear as parts with the highest growth rates in exports from the United States to Japan. 
These include parts such as jacks and spark plugs. 
A similar relationship between slow or negative growth types of parts exports to Japan 
and fast growing parts types exported to the United States seems to hold. We define slow 
growth exports as those parts whose shipments to Japan from the United States increased by 
95% or less during 1985-1989. Examples of such parts are steering systems, oil filters, and 
fuel injector parts. 
Table 13 
Trends in Parts Imports from Japan 
1985-1989 
3
Japan: Twice the 1985-1989 average 
percentage increase change or > 275% 
growth: from 274% to 67% increase 
Parts imports from Japan with below average 
or negative growth: from 66% to -8 1 % change 
Engines 
Steering components 
Air conditioning compressors 




Engine parts of all kinds (subassemblies) 
Crankshafts 
Disc brake parts 
Transmission parts 
Clutches and parts 










Starter mo tbrs 
Magnetos 
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It is possible to explain the negative correlation between high growth category of parts 
imports and the low growth category of exports through the theory of simple comparative 
advantage. Yet comparative advantage cannot explain why certain parts, such as jacks, whose 
production is most efficiently performed locally, are even involved in such long distance trade. 
Table 14 
Trends in Parts Exports to Japan 
1985-1989 
New or very fast growing parts exports to 
Japan: Twice the 1985-1989 average 
percentage increase change or > 377% 
Parts exports to Japan with near average 
growth: from 366% to 96% increase 
Parts exports to Japan with below average or 
negative growth: from 95% to -100% change 
Jacks 
Bumpers 
Fans and blowers 
Mirrors 





















12 volt batteries 
Steering systems 











We suspect that the answer has to do with the growth of the Japanese transplant parts 
manufacturing sector in the United States. As these facilities enter operation, shipments of 
their final products from Japan decline, while imports of various related sub-assemblies needed 
in production increase very quickly. Many of these facilities are of a size needed for efficient 
economies of scale. Initial demand for their output in the United States, however, may not 
reach their capacity levels. This excess capacity may be shipped back to Japan for installation 
into vehicles assembled there for the export or even domestic market. A large portion of U.S. 
parts exports to Japan, then, may well be attributable to Japanese-affiliated transplant parts 
makers in the United States. 
If the bulk of parts exports to Japan are shipments from Japanese transplant parts 
facilities in the United States, we must add a note of caution to our 1994 forecast of U.S. parts 
exports to Japan. We have forecast the 1994 U.S. vehicle sales market to reach a level of 16 
million. In this strong market, we also forecast a transplant build level of over 2.6 million 
units. It is very likely that the Japanese transplant assemblers will need all of the capacity 
available from their affiliated suppliers, leaving little capacity to produce output for export to 
Japan. If this is true, exports of U.S. made parts to Japan could decline as imports of parts 
rise, for the same reasons. Our forecast of the level of U.S. auto parts exports to Japan could 
be a serious overestimate. The auto parts deficit with Japan may now be highly cyclical, rising 
dramatically in large sales years, and falling in slow sales years, reflecting primarily the 
capacity needs of Japanese transplants in the United States. 
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V. A Case Study of Transplant Sourcing and Trade Content 
As a "reality check" to the statistical analyses performed on Japanese automotive parts 
imports and transplant production, the research team undertook a case study of one transplant 
facility's component sourcing. In addition, we sought a better understanding of the location of 
manufacturing value-added-from imports, in-house transplant assembly plant, transplant 
supplier, or traditional domestic supplier. Honda of America Manufacturing's Marysville 
assembly plant was selected as a well established transplant facility to give the best indication 
of future sourcing patterns for all transplant facilities. This established facility has high 
production volumes and extensive experience working with the U.S. supply base. As 
transplant production volumes grow and movement along experience curves develop we 
believe most transplant operations will follow a similar pattern. 
Methodology 
We created a sourcing matiix, Table 15, by dividing the automobile into ten major 
subsystems and two "other" categories. Each of these subsystems is further divided into 
individual parts or assembly categories for a total of 46 items. Using periodical clipping files, 
supplier dire~tories,~~,working k owledge, and publicly-available company information 
(Honda provided no confidential information), we then tie these parts to known import, 
transplant, or traditional domestic suppliers. 
We add a component cost estimate to this matrix, also shown in Table 15. We 
estimated these costs from industry and government sources, but primarily from work 
performed for the Michigan Department of Commerce's Auto-In-Michigan project.29 Using 
data obtained through the Foreign Trade Zone Board, we were able to estimate the value of in- 
bound and out-bound material from this plant. Dividing total vehicle production into out- 
bound value gives an average $10,013 value per vehicle produced. From Foreign Trade Board 
data on other transplant facilities and other references, we applied a 20% ratio for assembly and 
body-in-white value added by the assembly plant (or $2,000)-thus, total estimated purchased 
28Ja~anese Automotive Investment Directory, Third Edition, 1990, Brett C. Smith, The 
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute; The ELM Guide to J a ~ a n e s e  
Transplant Sup~liers, Second Edition 1989, ELM International, East Lansing, Michigan; T& 
ELM Guide to U.S. Automotive Sourcing, Third Edition 1989, ELM International, East ---- 
Lansing, Michigan; The Japanese Auto-Parts Industries, 1989190, Fourin, Incorporated, 
Nagoya, Japan. 
ZgAndrea, David J.; Everett, Mark; and Luria, Daniel, "Automobile Company Parts Sourcing: 
Implications for Michigan Suppliers," Auto-In-Michigan Project Newsletter, May 1988. 
components equal $8,013. We applied Auto-In-Michigan Project component cost ratios to the 
total $8,013 to obtain a new individual component cost base.30 
Using the component costs shown in Table 15, we multiplied vehicle unit production 
by component cost to obtain total component purchase value. We next divided that total 
component purchase value into three categories: import, transplant, and traditional domestic 
suppliers, based on every supplier we were able to identify from public sources. Because we 
lacked complete sourcing information we had to rely on a number of reasonable assumptions 
and guidelines. We used a residual model, subtracting total available transplant component 
value and a proportion of total available traditional component value from total component 
purchase value to obtain import value: 
Total component purchase value (estimated component cost * total production) 
- Total available to transplant suppliers (see below for value 
determination) 
Total available to traditional domestic sup111 - i e r ~  (again, see below) 
Residual import value. 
For each known transplant supplier, we multiplied the average auto industry value 
added per employee31 by number of company employees and divided by number of customers 
to obtain available value for transplant suppliers: 
Average auto industry value addedlemployee ($74,911 parts/$63,045 
stampings) * Pumber of emnlovees (obtained from industry directories) 
Theoretical maximum plant output 
I Number of Customers 
Theoretical component value available to the model transplant. 
This method puts a maximum company limit on what can be sourced into our case 
study's plant. For components having multiple suppliers we summed the individual companies 
to obtain a transplant supplier total. Because we were not able to obtain specific supplier dollar 
sales to the plant or the sales mix of individual suppliers, this is a rough estimate for any given 
supplier or component category. However, over the entire listing of 46 component entries and 
116 transplant company entries (not including captive transplant production, but including 
multiple company entries), we assume this estimation process will roughly balance 
underestimates and overestimates. 
- - 
30Note: rounding errors resulted in components adding to $8,030 in table 14. 
311988 Annual Survey Qf Manufacturers, Statistics for Industry Groups and Industries, M88 
(ASO-I), U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, May, 1990. 










Other engine parts 
Transmission 
Transmission assembly 
CV jointshalf shaft assembly 
Transmission case 
Gear sets]transmission parts 
Torque converter 
Other transmission parts 
EngineEmission Control 
Catalytic converter 
Fuel injectiontengine control module 
Fuel tank assembly 
Engine wiring harness 
Ignition system components 
Other enginelemission control parts 
Body 
Major body surface panels 
Bumperlfascia assemblies 
Structural body panels 
Small stampings 
Other body parts 
Comfort/Convenience/Electrical 
Air conditioningheating system 
Audio system 
Chassis wiring harness 
Heat exchangers 
Other wmfort/convenience parts 
SuspensionISteering 
Axle/suspension components 
Steering system components 
Strutslsprings 
Steering column components 
Other suspensionlsteering parts 
Glass 
Hardware 




Occupant restraint systems 





Master cylinderbrake components 
Other (including tires) brake/wheel/tire parts 
Other Parts (used in a variety of systems) 
Other Parts (not elsewhere classified including paint) 
Total Parts 
Assembly, profit, and overhead 
































































Imports Transplants Traditional 
We proceeded in the same manner for traditional domestic suppliers, except we divided 
the total available by 50 percent to obtain our estimate of actual sourcing. We did this because 
employment numbers of the domestics are more difficult to obtain-many listings include non- 
automotive and aftermarket production employment, which adds artificially to our estimate of 
total company auto output. Also, the Big Three dominate the sales mix of traditional suppliers, 
so this 50 percent reduction helps correct the formula's built in assumption that all customers 
source the same production value. 
Finally, to estimate pure imports into the plant, we subtracted the above results from 
our estimated total component value to obtain total import value. Several corrections were 
made to the above process to achieve our final sourcing estimates. First, on an individual 
component basis the above process was adapted as needed. For example, this plant sources 
engines and transmissions from allied plants in the United States and Japan. Because we were 
not provided employment numbers specific to products produced in allied U.S. plants, we 
assumed engine assembly and blocks and transmission assembly and blocks to be divided 
equally 50/50 between imports and transplant sourcing. Another typical adjustment assumes 
25 percent import sourcing on components for which we found only one transplant supplier- 
although the value available from that transplant supplier is estimated to cover the entire 
component need, we assume the assembler has a second supplier to reduce supply interruption 
risk. We believe our assumptions are reasonable, given our base of specific and general 
industry practice information. 
Our second major correction involves the estimation of second and third tier sourcing 
patterns. For transplant suppliers we assume that 25% of their production is import content 
and 5% is actually sourced from traditional domestic suppliers. This import estimate is 
conservative-some estimate this percentage as high as 50% or more. Whatever the actual 
number, we believe our final forecast provides a minimum likely import percentage and 
maximum, likely, domestic value-added percentage. For traditional domestic suppliers we 
assume 10% of sourcing is import content and no sourcing is from the transplant suppliers. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 16 summarizes our case study results by major system. Based on the 
information we were able to obtain and analyze, we estimate this transplant's output to be 38% 
import content, 46% from transplants (including assembly and allied operations), and 16% 
from traditional domestic suppliers. 
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Applying these percentages to our estimated $10,030, we estimate $3,820 of import 
parts value per transplant produced, with $4,625 contributed from transplant facilities 
(including wholely-owned and joint-venture facilities) and $1,585 from traditional domestic 
suppliers. 
Table 16 
Transplant Sourcing Case Study 
Summary Results 
Scanning the systems, it is apparent that domestic suppliers are generally 
underrepresented in the three major vehicle systems: engine, transmission, and body structure. 
By our estimates, these systems have about $3,300 (33% of total) of value. The most 
significant systems inroads by the domestics-hardware, glass, brakes/wheels/tires, and 
interior hard and soft trim-have approximately $1,400 (14% of total) of value. This 
substantiates domestic supplier concerns through this transition period of Japanese production 
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yielded domestic suppliers relatively equal participation across all systems, but has 
concentrated that participation into categories that have lower value-added (thus, lower profit 
margins) and substantial competition (thus, increased marketing costs and risk of future loss of 
business). 
Our concern about expansion of the transplant supply base is also substantiated by 
looking at the systems with high transplant-sourced (read new capacity) percentages. Engine, 
engineJemission control, stampings, interior hard and soft trim and seats, brakes/wheels/tires, 
and miscellaneous components lead transplant sourcing. In each of these systems, over one- 
third of this transplant facility's components are sourced from new transplant supplier capacity 
while each system has major domestic industry capacity available (e.g., Allied-Signal, Dana, 
Eaton, Johnson Controls, Kelsey-Hayes, and TRW). 
We believe this case study presents a rational method for analyzing and representing the 
source of value-added from a transplant vehicle assembly plant. Our assumptions are 
conservative. The results show a lower domestic value-added than is publicly quoted by the 
company but higher than some recent academic studies. 
Our case study results inform a number of remaining issues on transplant sourcing, as 
well as our most likely forecast of Japanese parts exports to the United States in 1994. The 
sourcing percentages listed at the bottom of Table 16 can first be compared with our aggregate 
estimates in Table 12. In Table 12, we estimated the average Japanese import content of 1989 
to be 35%, yet our case study estimate is somewhat higher at 38%. The 38% import content 
level is near the level many experts say is needed to reach 74-75% "CAFE-content" for Honda. 
Since Honda is often considered by many experts to be the most advanced of the Japanese 
transplants in terms of domestic sourcing, the remaining high level of Japanese content is 
sobering. No other current transplant is likely to be operating at this reduced level of Japanese 
content. This could mean that we underestimated the likely level of 1994 Japanese parts 
exports to the United States and attribute too large a share of these exports to the aftermarket 
rather than to transplant demand. 
Our 1989 aggregate sourcing estimate (Table 12) attributes only 12.5% of average 
transplant value to traditional U.S. suppliers and third country imports. Our case study 
attributes 16.0% to domestic sources, a more positive estimate. Other transplants can be 
expected, then, to increase their sourcing to traditional U.S. parts makers in a similar fashion. 
On the other hand, domestic parts contracts are likely to remain small. We have identified 203 
U.S. facilities currently supplying Honda. This may be overstated because 19 facilities are 
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joint ventures and may have reported sourcing from both the joint-venture facility as well as the 
parent firm. Of the 203, 113 are traditional domestic f m s  and 90 are transplants. The 113 
traditional domestic firms may be overstated by the 19 joint venture operations. The 109 
Japanese affiliated producers share 33% of total component value of output with the assembly 
firm itself. An additional 48% of total component value is imported from Japan. The 
remaining 20% of parts value is shared by the 94 traditional U.S. producers who make up 46% 
of the 203 domestic supplier facilities we identified for this case study. Thus, the average sales 
of true Japanese-affiliated suppliers to Honda are likely to be some 50% higher than the sales 
of the traditional domestics. 
We did perform some analysis of the case study firm's sourcing in Japan compared 
with their practice in the United States. We used a popular supplier directory on Japanese 
automotive sourcing to identify 165 first-tier Japanese suppliers to Honda in Japan. Of these 
165, 78 (47%) are currently producing in the United States. Our internal transplant sourcing 
directory lists 70 of these firms supplying the case study assembly plant. These 70 firms 
constitute 42% of the case study's 165 key Japanese suppliers in Japan, 78% of their solely 
Japanese-owned suppliers in the United States, and 35% of the total count of 203 U.S. located 
suppliers for this firm. We identified 30 "equity keiretsu" supplier fms,  or f m s  in which the 
case study assembler owns significant shares of equity.32 Of these 30, 17 now produce in the 
United States and supply the case study assembly plant. 
We relate $3,820 of Japanese parts imports to each vehicle produced in the case study 
assembly plant. This level is considerably higher than the estimated $3,223 of Japanese 
imports related to transplant assemblies derived from our regression analysis. Yet we can 
attribute a large portion of the difference to the richer mix of cars produced in this assembly 
plant compared with those assembled across all transplants. In 1989,233,000 of the 362,000 
cars assembled at Honda Marysville were medium-priced compacts. Subzone data for this 
plant, for the years 1987-1989, is shown in Figure 16. Reported subzone imports of Japanese 
parts per vehicle fell from a level of $4,714 (61% of total shipments out of the plant) in 1987 to 
$2,810 per vehicle (28%) in 1989. The 1989 levels also reflect imported parts shipped through 
a nearby captive engine plant. The 1989 subzone report states that $7,203 of U.S. domestic 
32The system of manufacturers holding equity share in suppliers is quite common in Japan, 
and is often treated in the United States as an important part of the "keiretsu" system. We note 
that Honda has consistently maintained that it does not participate in a keiretsu, nor does it 
maintain the tight control over its suppliers often attributed to other Japanese vehicle 
manufacturers. We do not think that the 17 equity participation suppliers now producing in the 
United States contradicts Honda's assertion. 
parts or production were used in each car shipped from the zone. On the basis of our case 
study results, we estimate that $1,010 of the value of these parts ($3,810 - $2,810) were 
actually imported from Japan and sourced through domestic parts facilities into the assembly 
plant subzone. The actual domestic vehicle content level is $6,193 or 62% of the reported 
value of the cars shipped from the subzone. Subzone reporting clearly overestimates the 
domestic content of transplant vehicles, since all domestic parts shipments, except those from 
other subzones, are counted as 100% domestic. 
Figure 16 
Subzone 46b Official Content 







Source: Foreign Trade Zone Board 
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VI. Final Forecast and Discussion 
Results. Our vehicle trade forecast-shown in Tables 5 and 7, and our parts trade forecast, 
shown in Table 9-are combined to yield overall estimates of the U.S.-Japan bilateral 
automotive deficit for 1994. Once again, we generate both constant and current dollar forecasts 
for both the "Best Trade Case" and "Most Likely Case" scenarios of the projected deficit. 
Our various estimates of the bilateral automotive deficit are shown in Table 17 and 
Figure 17. Our "Best Trade Case" projects a constant dollar 1994 deficit of $29.41 billion, or 
a 5% reduction from the 1990 level of $31.10 billion. Our "Best Trade Case" forecast of the 
current dollar level of the deficit is $35.24 billion, or a 13% increase over the 1990 deficit. In 
both constant and current dollars, the share of parts deficit as a portion of the "Best Trade 
Case" overall automotive deficit rises from 34% in 1990 to 47% in 1994. 
Our "Most Likely Case" projects a constant dollar 1994 deficit of $38.14 billion, or a 
23% increase from the 1990 level of $31.10 billion. Our "Most Likely Case" forecast of the 
current dollar level of the deficit is $45.70 billion, or an increase of 47% compared with 1990. 
Table 17 
U.S.-Japan Automotive Trade Deficit: 
Two 1994 Scenarios 
(in billions of dollars) 
"Best Trade Case" 
' U.S.-Japan Vehicle Deficit 
U.S.-Japan Automotive Parts 
Deficit 










"Most Likely Trade Case" 
U.S.-Japan Vehicle Deficit 












In constant and current dollars, the share of parts deficit as a portion of the "Most Likely Case" 
overall automotive deficit rises from 34% in 1990 to 48% in 1994. 
We foresee a decline in the bilateral deficit in only one of the four projected deficits, the 
constant dollar "Best Trade Case"; and this decrease is limited to 5%. We foresee increases of 
13 to 47% in our other three estimates. In all four estimates, the share of the parts deficit rises 
to almost half of the projected overall bilateral automotive deficit. We consider this 
development to be a major change in composition that will affect the course and meaning of 
future automotive trade between the United States and Japan. We expect two other sets of 
issues, economic and political, will also play large roles in affecting the pattern of future 
bilateral trade. 
+ U.S.-Japan Automotive Deficit (constant $) 
+ U.S.-Japan Automotive Deficit-Most Likely (constant $) 
-6- U.S.-Japan Automotive Deficit-Best Case (constant $) 
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Economic Issues. We estimate that by 1990, Japanese automotive firms invested $13 billion 
in buildings and equipment located in at least 250 parts and assembly facilities in the United 
States. Our conservative estimate of the U.S. employment of these 250 facilities is 78,000. 
We forecast that by 1994, Japanese automotive firms will assemble more vehicles in the United 
States than they will export to the United States from Japan. Despite these developments, 
perhaps even because of them, we confidently predict that the 1994 bilateral trade deficit will be 
23% higher in constant dollars than the level experienced in 1990. 
We believe that the major driver of future U.S.-Japanese automotive trade will be the 
same as in the past: the strategic behavior of Japanese automotive firms. These firms claim, 
with some justice, that trade deficits measured in U.S. dollars overstate the problem of the 
trade imbalance. Japanese firms seek to earn amounts measured in real yen. The general 
pattern of the bilateral deficits we examine in this study take on a different character when 
measured in Japanese currency. However, these deficits are a U.S. problem, and dollars are 
the appropriate measure of these problems. This study presents evidence of major changes in 
trade performance by Japanese exporters that will alleviate many of the problems of currency 
exchange rates, especially for earnings. Exports from Japan, in vehicles or parts, will include 
higher margins than in the past. A larger portion of Japanese exports to the United States will 
be composed of luxury cars and aftermarket parts than in the past. Production of low-margin 
products will be shifted to regional markets worldwide. Such behavior on the part of Japanese 
automotive producers is nothing less than an exercise in efficient resource allocation from their 
point of view. 
Japanese automotive firms are still committed to rapid growth in their world market 
share, and eventually growth in their share of world automotive profits. To accomplish these 
goals, we believe, they will continue to seek policies that protect their domestic markets from 
serious inroads from foreign competition, in vehicles or parts. They will aggressively pursue 
market share in North America, Western Europe, and in developing markets that include 
Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe. They will adopt the price policies, design strategies, and 
productivity improvements that are necessary to maintain their growth. They will make full use 
of the Japanese economy's many exporting advantages for domestic f m s .  They will also take 
full advantage of their international competitor's disadvantages in responding to such 
competition in less able economies. In other words, Japanese automotive producers will 
continue to practice strategic trade.33 
U.S. automotive firms also participate in foreign markets, and still practice a 
"community style" of globalization, exemplified by over 50 years of Ford and General Motors 
efforts in Western Europe. Overseas capacity is carefully built in periods of growth or through 
approved buyouts and joint ventures. This results in an almost completely independent foreign 
subsidiary, recognized by all as a full domestic producer with rights and duties, and largely 
innocent of bringing about displacement costs to workers, firms, communities, and national 
economies. Such operations require political skill, time, and above all, patience. The rewards 
include a share of business and a voice in decision making. The striking feature is that old 
capacity is purchased, current workers and suppliers reemployed by the new "foreign" owners, 
and new capacity only brought on line in an environment of market growth that can be shared 
with a11.34 
In stark contrast, the Japanese engage in a "new competitor style" of globalization, 
exemplified by Japan's aggressive use of new capacity, either in Japan or in North America, to 
displace traditional domestic capacity, as well as other imports. This style of globalization 
involves new plants, new workers, and new suppliers displacing current industry participants. 
This method requires enormous volumes of investment capital and the willingness to assume 
possibly severe political and economic costs in the medium run, since a serious overcapacity 
situation often directly results. Above all, new competitor globalization does not seem to 
permit sharing of markets with existing domestic capacity. In fact, existing competitors are 
placed under the most intense pressure during times of economic distress. 
Our study has forecast that automotive parts will take a far larger future share of the 
overall bilateral deficit. Instead of American consumers determining directly the 
size of the bilateral deficit through their choice of vehicle purchases, half the 
3 3 ~ h e  VER program is actually administered by MITI. Recent, serious losses in net earnings 
by U,S, auto producers during the current sales downturn are clear evidence of the U.S. 
disadvantage in "fixed" not variable costs. The Japanese producers may now possess their 
largest competitive advantage, not in variable cost or quality, but in relative fxed  costs per unit. 
Many of the components of fixed costs for U.S. producers are beyond their ability to control, 
and are more properly the subject of policy attention by government. 
3 4 ~  recent example is General Motors purchase of 50% of the equity of S AAB in Sweden. An 
existing SAAB plant will be converted to produce Opels. The only U.S. example of Japanese 
use of a brownfield site and existing workers is the NUMMI joint venture with General Motors 
in California. 
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deficit may now be determined directly by Japanese automotive firms operating 
in the United States or Japan, through their specific decisions on sourcing, 
Perhaps the most intensive pressure is placed on the American automotive supplier 
industry. Our supplier industry, by itself, is the largest manufacturing industry in the United 
States, with shipments of at least $103 billion and employment of 618,000 in 1990.35 The 
rising tide of Japanese imported automotive parts in recent years seems, at fnst inspection, to 
be a modern version of carrying "coals to Newcastle." Whatever the competitive reasoning for 
the imbalance in U.S.-Japan automotive parts trade, the size of our current industry and its 
general economic importance make further investigation of this disparity and the reasons 
behind it all the more critical. 
The sum of social costs for regions facing Japanese corporate competition are high. 
The U.S. automotive trade deficit with Japan totals $185 billion in current dollars alone during 
1985-1990; up to 500,000 U.S. employees and their families have been displaced since 1979; 
and many U.S. communities and r large portion of U.S. durable goods manufacturing are 
permanently depressed. Finally, these structural changes clearly have not assisted the U.S. 
government in its fiscal difficulties, either now or during the 1980s. 
In return, U.S. communities have benefited from 78,000 new jobs in the Japanese 
affiliated auto industry, and consumers may have received higher value generally, if not 
currently lower prices, on their purchases of compact and subcompact cars.36 A tradeoff with 
the social cost of Japanese competition does exist, and will certainly involve political decision 
making at the highest level. 
Political Issues. A major political issue facing the United States and Japan is the sustainability 
of the current level of their bilateral trade imbalance. While both governments view it as 
unsustainable, the U.S. government has seemed remarkably tolerant of this deficit throughout 
the 1980s. Some analysts speculate that the United States perhaps views it as an appropriate 
exchange for Japanese political and diplomatic support, while others see it as a consistent 
351991 U.S. Industrial Outlook, International Trade Administration, U.S. Government 
Printing Office, Washington D.C., p.37-10. 
36~here does seem to be evidence that Japanese vehicles now sell at higher purchase prices 
than competing U.S. traditional vehicles in the same segments. This certainly should make the 
exercise of determining gains to consumer surplus from unilateral free trade with Japan all the 
more interesting. As far as we know, the argument that large bilateral trade imbalances 
generally raise consumer prices, not lower them, remains unrefuted. 
application of the government's abiding belief in the principles of free trade and the efficacy of 
leading by example. 
The U.S. government has pressured Japan to undertake structural reforms that would 
open its markets for many products, arguing that increased U.S. exports is a better solution to 
trade imbalances than reductions in U.S. imports. The government has even undertaken 
targeted  MOSS^^ efforts in the automotive parts sector. However, both general and targeted 
efforts have been disappointing to date, and the imbalance remains large, and, as discussed in 
Section I, heavily concentrated in the automotive sector. Trade friction continues in many 
areas, including semiconductors, rice, and automotive goods. 
The fundamental dilemma facing both the U.S. and Japanese governments is how long 
these deficits can continue, especially in light of the current recession in the United States. It 
will take some time for fundamental reforms to have an effect on this deficit, if indeed they ever 
will. The deficit may become an impo~-tant domestic political issue in the United States, 
especially in the current economic conditions. Our own belief is that the U.S. government is 
very unlikely to take any serious steps to limit Japanese automotive imports or investments by 
1994, and will view as acceptable any political risks this position may entail. 
On the other hand, we expect the Japanese government to be concerned about potential 
political problems in the United States. The Japanese government recognizes that it must 
maintain a good relationship with the legislative as well as executive branch of the U.S. 
government, and frequently expresses concerns about the image of Japan among the American 
people. We suspect that the government will informally encourage the Japanese automotive 
industry 1) to restrain its activities in the United States; 2) to source more U.S. automotive 
parts; and 3) to avoid resisting the growth of import vehicle market share in Japan. 
We think that the efforts of the Japanese government to reduce the bilateral automotive 
trade deficit will likely emphasize increasing U.S. automotive exports to Japan. This is 
consistent with the U.S. government strategy, and therefore offers some political benefits. 
Moreover, such efforts may be less disruptive to the Japanese automotive companies' strategies 
than a significant change in their export patterns. Of course, it faces the same inherent 
weakness: even a notably successful effort to improve U.S. automotive imports into Japan 
starts from such a low base that it is unlikely to have major effect on the imbalance by 1994. 
 MOSS (for Market Oriented, Sector Specific) negotiations/discussions permit the U.S. 
government to address specific sources of trade friction with particular trading partners in 
isolation from general trade issues. 
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However, should the government make these efforts, it is unclear how successful it 
will be. The Japanese automotive industry, like its U.S. counterpart, is driven by corporate 
goals and strategies, and has proven itself capable of resisting government pressure. We 
suspect that any such Japanese government efforts will meet with limited success at best, as 
each company pursues its own best interest. 
To be sure, the Japanese vehicle manufacturers are concerned with their public image in 
the United States, and certainly try not to be seen as rapacious or damaging to the U.S. 
economy. After all, six of the nine Japanese auto manufacturers enjoy higher unit sales in the 
U.S. market than in their home market. They undoubtedly will act in a restrained way if that is 
in their best interest. However, we suspect that such concerns will likely be muted by hopes 
that other companies will show the necessary restraint and concerns that they will not. 
The growing importance of the bilateral automotive parts trade deficit makes it a 
sensible target for deficit reduction efforts. As indicated above, MOSS talks aimed at 
increasing U.S. parts exports to Japan are continuing between the two countries, reflecting the 
overall U.S. emphasis on reducing its trade deficits through expanding U.S. exports. 
However, the low current level of U.S. automotive parts exports to Japan make even a 
successful export effort a long-term solution at best. Japanese business practices in general, 
including close and enduring supplier relations, and automotive sourcing strategies in 
particular, including tying the selection of new suppliers to new model introductions, suggest 
that achieving significant levels of parts exports will take some time. It will take years for the 
Japanese manufacturers to develop interest in and consider U.S. parts, qualify them for use, 
and actually award the numerous and substantial contracts that will boost U.S. parts exports by 
the required factor of six to twelve times current levels. 
Any near term hope of significantly reducing this key deficit lies in the reduction of 
Japanese parts exports to the United States. The two major sources of U.S. demand for these 
imported parts are for transplant manufacturing use, and the use of imported parts to service 
Japanese nameplate vehicles in operation. Transplant manufacturers represent both direct 
demand, through their own sourcing of Japanese parts, and indirect demand, due to their 
reliance on Japanese transplants suppliers, who themselves rely on high levels of parts sourced 
from Japan. This situation suggests a two-pronged strategy that the Japanese automotive 
industry itself might pursue to reduce the U.S. parts deficit. That strategy requires making 
serious and sustained efforts to increase the U.S. manufactured content of transplant vehicles. 
The most direct method of achieving this would be through, first, replacing Japanese import 
parts at both the manufacturers and transplant suppliers by, second, increased sourcing from 
traditional U.S. suppliers. Such a strategy could rapidly and significantly lower the bilateral 
parts deficit, and thus both the overall U.S.-Japan automotive deficit and the worldwide U.S. 
parts deficit. 
The Japanese industry's standard rationale for its existing sourcing practices charges 
that the traditional U.S. parts industry cannot meet Japanese cost and quality requirements. In 
effect, this alleges that the U.S. supplier industry is not up to Japanese standards, and that 
competitive success demands, in some instances, direct parts imports from Japan, and in 
others, production in the United States, heavily supported by Japanese imports. However, the 
Japanese manufacturers certainly have it within their control to change these existing business 
strategies. The manufacturers could decide to undertake concerted efforts to select traditional 
U.S. suppliers, and work with these suppliers to upgrade their cost and quality performance. 
This would decrease the transplants' need to rely on imports, providing a major avenue to 
reduction of the trade deficit, and avoiding the potential explosion in parts imports forecast by 
our study. It might also eventually encourage expanded U.S. parts exports to Japan, as these 
U.S. suppliers pursued opportunities there, based on their performance records at the 
transplants. 
To be sure, such an "affirmative action" effort might involve some near-term risks and 
costs in the Japanese industry's view. However, those risks are small. They might, at worse, 
entail some reduction in an assumed competitive advantage over the Big Three, but there is no 
reason to expect them to result in a competitive disadvantage. Moreover, the Japanese 
assemblers have recent-and successful-experience in rapidly developing a supplier industry 
to world class standards. After all, the Japanese supplier industry itself certainly benefited 
from just such an effort during the 1950s and 1960s, and the achievements of those suppliers 
have amply repaid any initial costs such a strategy imposed on the manufacturers. 
Finally, reducing the bilateral imbalance in parts trade will confer other benefits on the 
Japanese industry, and those benefits will also provide compensation for any start-up costs in 
sourcing from traditional U.S. suppliers. These benefits will likely include enhanced 
perceptions of transplant vehicles as "American," and of their manufacturers as "good 
corporate citizens," two objectives the Japanese industry has been pursuing for some time. 
The potential benefits of such a strategy are such that we would consider the efforts to 
implement it as investments rather than costs, and investments with high potential returns at 
that. 
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Another Japanese strategy could preserve competitive success in the United States and 
permit a lessening of the bilateral automotive trade deficit. This strategy relies on sourcing 
automotive goods from Japanese-controlled facilities in third countries, and such facilities have 
been rapidly expanding since the yen strengthened during 1985 and 1986. For example, a 
Japanese manufacturer could import parts from its affiliates in Thailand for use in its U.S. 
production. That preserves the manufacturers sourcing preferences, but does not add to the 
bilateral parts deficit. Rather, it shifts some of the U.S. bilateral deficit with Japan into the 
U.S. bilateral deficit with Thailand. To the extent that the Japanese manufacturers rely on this 
strategy, our estimates of the specific bilateral balance with Japan will be high, although it will 
still accurately reflect the "Japanese-controlled" automotive deficit38 
The Japanese manufacturers' production in the United States has increased rapidly 
since the mid-1980s. It is virtually certain that at some point their sales in the U.S. market will 
"cro~sover,~' and be sourced more from U.S. production than from imports from Japan. We 
suspect that that will have two important political results. First, it will seriously undercut the 
political efficacy of any economic concerns about the health of the traditional U.S. vehicle 
manufacturers. Second, it will shift a substantial portion of the bilateral automotive deficit into 
the parts category, and that will weaken the traditional industry's ability to influence policy 
responses. The parts industry is simply less visible, less organized, and less influential than is 
the Big Three. 
On balance, we expect to see little on the political front that will moderate the bilateral 
automotive trade deficit, at least by 1994. U.S. government efforts will continue along current 
lines, and will have, at best, marginal effect on the imbalance. We think that the Japanese 
industry may exercise some small restraint in the U.S. market, but these efforts may be 
directed more to image protection, through third-country sourcing, than to substantive efforts, 
such as increased domestic sourcing. 
380ne of the ironies of our trading relationship with Japan is that the success of the Japanese 
automotive industry in the U.S. market has supported its moves away from Japan and into 
Southeast Asia. Profits from the U.S. market have defrayed the costs of these moves, and the 
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U.S. Automotive Imports from Japan 
General Imports 
(in millions of dollars) 
U.S.-Japan Automotive Trade Deficit 








' * Constant 1990 dollars, using September 1990 and 1985 producer price index for motor 
vehicles from Survey of Current Business. 
Source: U.S. International Trade Commission 
Parts Vehicles 
* Constant 1990 dollars, using September 1990 and 1985 producer price index for motor . 
vehicles from Survey of Current Business. 
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Appendix I1 
International Trade Commission 
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Appendix I1 
Domestic U.S. Exports to Japan 
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Appendix III 
International Trade Administration Data 
U.S.-Japan Bilaterial Trade in Automotive Paxts 
1985-1989 
(sorted by 1989 commodity shipment value) 







U.S. Automotive Parts Imports from Japan (in thousands of U.S. dollars): 1985-1989 

U.S. Automotive Palls Imports from Japan (in thousands of U.S. dollars): 1985-1989 

U.S. Automotive Parts Imports from Japan (in thousands of U.S. dollars): 1985-1989 
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U.S. Automotive Parts Imports from Japan (in thousands of U.S. dollars): 1985-1989 

U.S. Automotive Parts Imports from Japan (in thousands of U.S. dollars): 1985-1989 
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Empirical Models and Estimations 

Appendix IV 
This appendix details the empirical models and estimations we use to forecast the level 
of Japanese automotive parts exports to the United States in 1994. A special focus of this 
analysis are the contribution effects or rates of various sources of demand for imported 
Japanese auto parts. The essential estimation model used in our multiple regression analysis is 
the following: 
PartsImportst = FITransProdt, Big3Prodt, JapanFleett, Time] 
Where: 
PartsImportst refer to monthly levels, in thousands of dollars, of ITC reported, total levels 
of customs valued automotive parts imports into the United States from Japan for the period 
January, 1985 through September, 1990. These values were inflated by the BLS producer 
price index for motor vehicles and equipment (SIC 371), with September, 1990 as the base 
month. 
TransProdt refers to monthly levels of reported Japanese transplant vehicle production in the 
United States for the period January, 1985 through September, 1990. 
Big3Prodt refers to monthly levels of reported General Motors, Ford and Chrysler 
"traditional content" tehicle production in the United States for the period January, 1985 
through March, 1990. 
JapanFleett refers to a special series of estimated monthly levels, in thousands, of the 
Japanese affiliated operating car fleet in the United States for the period January, 1985 through 
September, 1990. The data source is Polk Statistic's Vehicles in Operation as of July 1, 
Import Passenger Cars for the years 1985-1989. The monthly levels are derived from our 
transformation of annual incremental change in the Japanese operating fleet into monthly 
incremental change bases on weights calculated from monthly Japanese vehicle (transplant and 
import) sales in the United States. Since the latest year for which we were provided fleet data 
was 1989, the fleet levels cover only 54 months: January, 1985 through July, 1989. 
We explain in Section IV that Japanese imported parts price information, on any series 
basis, does not exist. We did attempt to include a series on the yen-dollar exchange rate, both 
real and alternatively nominal, in the multiple regression analysis. This variable performed 
poorly, regardless of the specification used. The performance of the exchange rate in analysis 
was expected. We also obtained poor results for a Japanese import passenger car price 
variable in our 198g1 study, quarterly estimation. Price and exchange rate variables were also 
expected to lack significance or effect in an estimation using a monthly series. Parts contracts 
in the auto industry, pa.rticularly the Japanese motor vehicle industry, are reassigned on a 
longer basis than month-to-month. However, we did attempt to use a variety of coincident, 
lead and moving average transformations of the yen-dollar rate in our analysis with no success. 
Descriptive statistics for the major analytical variables are shown in Table IV-1. 
'Michael S. Flynn, Sean P. McAlinden, and David J. Andrea, The u.S.-Ja~an Bilateral 1993 
Automotive Trade Deficit, Office for the Study of Automotive Transportation, Transportation 




Table XV- 1 
Descriptive Measures 
A major concern in our analysis was intercorrelation between the explanatory variables. 
A simple correlation matrix of these variables is given in Table IV-2. 
Strong positive correlation exists between TransProdt and JapanFleett and between 
these two variables and time. A mild negative correlation is found between, both time and 
JapanFleett and Big3Prodt. On the other hand, no correlation is found between 
TransProdt and Big3Prodt (-.0221<.2681 at .05) in the matrix results shown in Table III- 
2. On the other hand, a simple pairwise correlation between these two variables does detect 































































In practice, we could not simultaneously include Big3Prodt and TransProdt in our 
regression estimations. When both variables are included, standard errors of both regression 
coefficients increase to very high levels, and a nonsensical sign appeared for Big3Prodt. 
These are classic symptoms of strong multicollinearity. 
We directly estimate the effects of TransProdt and JapanFleett on PartsImportst 
in our 54 case "fleet model." The results are shown in Table IV-2. 
Table IV-3 
Least Squares Regression 
Analysis of variance of PartsIrnports N= 54 out of 69 
A significant coefficient of $3,034 for coincident TransProdt is found in this 













significant dummy variable for the months of December and January improves the standard 
error of the regression. A variety of dummy variables and transplant interaction terms with 
calender and model year periods failed to prove significant. The presence of autocorrelation 
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V A W L E  
Durbin- 
Watson 
A second estimation, "the linear trend" model," is performed that uses all 69 cases 
available for PartsImportst and TransProdt. A simple linear count or time is included in 
































Least Squares Regression 










A significant coefficient of $3,223 for coincident TransProdt is found in this 
estimation. A significant interaction t e n  for the first nine months of 1990 TransProdt is 
found that lowers the estimate of import sourcing by -$1,542 per transplant unit. Once again, 
we find that a January and December dummy variable improves the fit of the regression. The 
time trend variable proved highly significant. Autocorrelation was not detected. It is this 
estimation that we use to perform our forecast of 1994 Japanese automotive parts exports to the 
United States. The corrected and uncorrected, for time interaction effects, coefficients for 
transplant import sourcing allow us to hypothesize both "best trade" and "most likely" 
scenarios. The standard error is $63.3 million and is the best obtained in any of our 
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linear time trend. Our study forecast of 1994 Japanese automotive parts exports to the United 












The above linear specifications are also used to gain some understanding as to the direct 
effect of Big3Prodt on levels of Japanese exports of auto parts to the United States. This 
variable is substituted for TransProdt in the two estimations. The results are shown in 

















that a variety of other specifications were employed in this analysis aside from the linear forms 



















"Big3Prod Fleet" Model Estimation 
Least Squares Regression 



























"Big3Prod Linear Trend" Model Estimation 
Least Squares Regression 





















































Assumptions and Empirical Estimations: 
Conversion of Constant Dollar 1994 Forecasts to 1994 Current Prices 

Appendix V 
This Appendix details the assumptions and empirical estimations we use to translate our 
constant dollar 1994 forecasts of U.S.-Japan automotive trade to 1994 current prices. 
Generally, different methods are applied to imports and export parts categories. 
Dollar levels of 1994 vehicle exports to Japan are determined by multiplying our unit 
level forecasts by 1990 average reported custom value. We transformed these resulting dollar 
amounts to current 1994 dollars by assuming a 4.5% annual growth rate in price, 1991 through 
1994, or a total average price percentage change of 19.25%. This same percentage increase is 
simply applied to the current dollar forecast for automotive parts exports to Japan from the 
United States. 
Our 1989 study of the bilateral deficit includes an analysis of the determinants of 
Japanese vehicle price change based on price data for 1972-1988 supplied by a domestic 
manufacturer. Our analysis found that a 10% decline the real yen-dollar rate would result in a 
3.4% increase in Japanese vehicle list price controlling for the effects of the U.S. Consumer 
Price Index-All Urban Consumers (CPI). Japanese list price was also related to the CPI; a 
10% increase in this index bringing about an average 8% increase in Japanese vehicle list price. 
Japanese list price was then related to change in vehicle customs value, or the "pass through" 
effect. The "pass through" effect typically lowered the change in custom value to 60% of the 
given estimated change in Japanese list price based on forecast changes in the level of the U.S. 
CPI and the real yen-dollar exchange rate. 
We used this method to produce current dollar levels of our constant dollar forecasts 
with one major change. We did not reduce the expected change in Japanese custom values by 
an expected "pass through" effect," but assumed the full expected change in 1994 Japanese list 
price would be reflected in average 1994 customs value. We assumed a four-year change in 
the level of the CPI of 19.25%, and a drop in the level of the real yen-dollar rate from 135 in 
1990 to 120 in 1994. This resulted in an estimated percentage change in price of 19.7% for the 
1991-1994 period. This percentage change is applied to both vehicle and parts imports levels 
we forecast for 1994 to produce companion current dollar levels. 

Appendix VI 
U.S.-Japan Automotive Components Trade 
1989 Yearly Data and 
1985-1989 Average Yearly Growth Ratel 
Percentage Change Between 1985 and 1989 
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Appendix VII 
Conversion of Vehicle Segments to Trade Classifications 
1990 and 1994 "Best Case" and "Most Likely" Scenarios 

Table 1 
Japanese Vehicles in the 1990 U.S. Market 
(units in thousands) 
Passenger Car Market 
Light Truck Market 
16.3% 
Memo: The 1990 passenger car market = 9.3 million; Japanese transplants (including Canada), 
15%; Japanese imports, 18.6%. The 1990 light truck market = 4.559 million; Japanese 






























































1994 U.S. Sales of Japanese Vehicles: "Best Case" Market 
(units in thousands) 









































Memo: The 1994 passenger car market = 11.0 million; Japanese transplants (including possible 
Canada), 16.2%; Japanese imports, 13.6%. The 1990 light truck market = 5.0 million; Japanese 








































Notes: Segment market shares were estimated based on domestic build from Ward's 
Automotive Reports, with Japanese import sales added. 
Table 3 
1994 U.S. Sales of Japanese Vehicles: "Most Likely" Market 
(units in thousands) 
Passenger Car Market 
Build schedules for transplant passenger cars: 
Best Trade Case: build 1.897 million, sell 1.782 million (export 70,000 to Japan, and 






Most Likely Case: build 2.1 10 million, sell 2.026 million (export 50,000 to Japan, and 
35,000 to Europe) 
Memo: The 1994 passenger car market = 11.0 million; Japanese transplants (including possible 
Canada), 18.4%; Japanese imports, 15.5%. The 1990 light truck market = 5.0 million; Japanese 
















We assume that there are no exports in light trucks, so sales equals build, subject to the usual 
caveats about linking sales and production data. 








Best Trade Case: 7.040 million for U.S. sale (64% of the market), plus 39,000 for 
export to Japan, plus other exports. 49,000 exports to Japan reflect Japanese 
market of 4.8 million, with 7.5% import share, and U.S. maintaining 5.96% 
current share of imports, plus 20% of import share increase. 
Most Likely Case: 6.600 million for U.S. sale (60% of the market), plus 39,000 for 
export to Japan, plus other exports. 39,000 exports to Japan is less optimistic 
than 49,000, reflect about 13% of import share increase rather than 20% on 
base of 5.96% share. 
Total 
Japanese 
Sales 
(units) 
3,141 
438 
143 
3,722 
Japanese 
Segment 
Share 
(percent) 
54.1 % 
11.7 
10.0 
- 
Total 
Japanese 
SalesMix 
(percent) 
84.5% 
11.7 
3.8 
100.0% 
Japanese 
Import 
SalesMix 
(percent) 
79.9% 
11.7 
8.4 
100.0% 

